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A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by 
Federal Environmental Regulation: 




Robert L. Glicksman* 
Richard E. Levy‡ 
 
 In this paper, we draw on collective action theory1 and traditional preemption 
doctrine2 to develop a framework for thinking about environmental preemption, and then 
apply it in the context of regulation of greenhouse gases in response to global climate 
change.3  We begin with the fundamental premise that preemption doctrine can be 
understood as a means of allocating decisional responsibility between the federal and 
state governments with respect to matters as to which they exercise concurrent authority.4  
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1Collective action theory examines the dynamics of individual behavior in cooperative group settings.  
According to the seminal theories of Mancur Olson, because the benefits of collective behavior are often a 
species of public good that all members of the collective will enjoy regardless of their contribution to its 
creation, individual members of a collective have the incentive to “free ride” on the efforts of others.  See 
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).  For further discussion of collective action 
theory, see, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN, INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION (1986); MICHAEL 
HECHTER, PRINCIPLES OF GROUP SOLIDARITY (1987); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF 
NATIONS (1982); DAVID REISMAN, THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); TODD SANDLER, 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1992); and THOMAS SCHWARTZ, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE CHOICE (1986).  Collective action theory can also be applied to the behavior of states in a 
federal system, a theme that has been developed elsewhere by one of the authors.  See RICHARD E. LEVY, 
THE POWER TO LEGISLATE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE U. S. CONSTITUTION 83-90 (2006) [hereinafter 
THE POWER TO LEGISLATE]; Richard E. Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1241 
(1997) [hereinafter Federalism and Collective Action]; see also William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the 
Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003); Clayton P. Gillette, The 
Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347 (1997); Ken Killman et al., 
“Decentralization and the Search for Policy Solutions, 16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 102 (2000).   
2
 See infra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
3
 For further discussion of regulatory responses to global climate change, see GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND U.S. LAW (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007); Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: 
What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does this Say 
about Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006). 
4
 Under the Constitution, the federal government has authority to regulate through necessary and proper 
legislation within the fields of enumerated powers.  E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 
(1819).  In some areas, states have been deprived of authority to regulate and federal power is exclusive.  
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.  In all other areas states retain their power, which means that federal and state 
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Draft of article forthcoming in Vol. 102, Nw. U. L. Rev. 
Please do not quote without authors’ permission 
Environmental Preemption Glicksman&Levy Draft.doc Page 2 8/14/2007 
Because preemption in all its forms generally depends upon the purposes of federal 
regulation, the critical question is the extent to which those purposes justify the 
displacement of state regulatory authority. 
 
 The development of a framework for thinking about preemption issues is 
especially important in light of recent trends in the regulatory state.  From the New Deal 
through the “Great Society,” the dominant political and academic mentality assumed that 
government regulation was necessary to prevent abuse of economic power, protect public 
health and safety, and preserve the environment.  Over time, however, critics emerged to 
challenge these assumptions.  Academics extolled the virtues of free markets and argued 
that most regulation is the product of rent-seeking by special interests (cloaked in public 
interest rhetoric).5 Politicians blamed a variety of economic and social ills on excessive 
regulation, which they contended stifled economic growth while producing few, if any, 
measurable benefits (or at least benefits exceeded in magnitude by the costs, direct and 
indirect, of regulation).6  In light of this sustained challenge to the administrative state, 
we live in an era of regulatory skepticism.   
 
Even if the opponents of regulation have not succeeded in dismantling the modern 
regulatory state, they have had a significant impact on the political and legal landscape.7  
Deregulation or market-based approaches to regulation have been implemented in various 
areas.8  Statutes and executive orders direct federal agencies to assess the costs of 
regulation and seek the least burdensome alternatives.9  There are even some signs of 
more aggressive judicial review of government regulation.10  The modern regulatory state 
                                                                                                                                                 
authority in many fields is concurrent.  The Supreme Court has largely abandoned the view, often 
articulated as the basis for a restrictive reading of federal authority, that federal and state power are 
mutually exclusive.  See generally THE POWER TO LEGISLATE, supra note ___, at 46-50, 60-62. 
5
 This includes the “Chicago School” law and economics movement and supporters of public or social 
choice theory. 
6
 Examples include the Reagan Revolution and the Contract with America. 
7
 Of course, this sort of political change is never permanent, and the pendulum may have already begun to 
swing in the other direction, as proponents of regulation have regrouped and challenged the arguments of 
opponents of regulation.  See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: 
REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 
2006); A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Christopher H. 
Schroeder & Rena Steinzor eds., 2005); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION 
AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003); STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN 
UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL CLIMATE (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2005).  In some areas, moreover, experience with 
deregulation has served to remind us why regulation was seen as necessary in the first place.  See. e.g., 
Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron on 
Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1 (2004); Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking 
Reform of Electricity Markets, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497 (2005).  Cf. Rena Steinzor, “You Just Don’t 
Understand” − The Right and the Left in Conversation, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL L. INST.) 1109 (2002) 
(analyzing defects in California air pollution emission trading system). 
8
 See, e.g., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 20-21 (3d ed. 2003) (summarizing deregulation of transportation, energy, and 
telecommunications markets).  
9
 See, e.g. id. at 22-23 (summarizing such requirements). 
10
 In some of these cases, aggressive judicial review has taken the form of the imposition on agencies of 
rigorous burdens of proof to justify regulation.  See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 
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remains firmly established and the need for economic, health and safety, and 
environmental regulation is broadly accepted.  But in the era of regulatory skepticism, the 
creation of new regulatory programs is difficult and the implementation of existing 
programs is often less robust, as proponents of regulation bear a heavier burden of 
justification to persuade policy makers, and must overcome a variety of new legal 
hurdles.  
 
These forces are particularly apparent in the field of environmental law.  With 
some exceptions, the trend since the mid-1980s has been toward weakening federal laws 
that protect the environment.  Congress has weakened procedural requirements designed 
to make it more difficult for federal agencies to engage in, or authorize others to engage 
in, environmentally damaging activities.11  It has also removed or weakened some of the 
substantive constraints applicable to activities that are potentially harmful to public health 
or the environment.12  The executive branch, through the issuance of executive orders and 
agency regulations, has embarked upon a similar path, although the anti-regulatory thrust 
has been stronger under some administrations than others.  Finally, the federal courts 
have restricted the scope and watered down the content of federal environmental law 
through their interpretation and application of both constitutional and statutory 
doctrines.13 
 
Faced with an unreceptive federal government, environmentalists have 
increasingly turned to state and local regulatory bodies, many of which have been far 
more sympathetic to their regulatory agenda.  Some of these state and local entities have 
adopted environmental regulations that are more protective of the environment than their 
federal counterparts, only to encounter federal obstructions.  Many states and localities, 
for example, have responded to the federal government’s failure to craft a meaningful 
regulatory response to the threats posed by global climate change by embarking on their 
                                                                                                                                                 
(5th Cir. 1991).  In others, it has taken the form of the invocation of canons of statutory construction (such 
as the canon that statutes should be interpreted in such a way as to avoid raising constitutional issues) to 
interpret narrowly the scope of federal environmental legislation.  See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. 
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-
CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion).  In still others, the courts have found 
environmental legislation or regulations to be unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. 
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d in part, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).  See generally Richard E. Levy 
& Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism & Restraint in the Supreme Court’s Environmental Law 
Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 363-85 (1989) (discussing the Supreme Court’s substantive review of 
pro-development and pro-environmental decisions by agencies). 
11
 See, e.g., the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-148 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 
6501-6591) (exempting timber sales from federal environmental assessment requirements). 
12
 On several occasions, for example, Congress has exempted military activities from environmental 
legislation or subjected those activities to watered down versions of that legislation.  See Robert L. 
Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism:  The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law 
and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 768 (2006) (discussing legislation creating exemptions for 
military activities from the Endangered Species Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act). 
13
 For a thorough survey of the efforts engaged in by all three branches of the federal government whose 
effect has been to weaken federal environmental regulation, see Glicksman, supra note __, at 754-78. 
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own regulatory restrictions and launching their own emissions trading programs.14  
Insofar as the federal government has historically taken the lead in environmental 
protection, this represents something of a role reversal.   
 
Federal inaction and deregulation increasingly presents a new kind of preemption 
question: when does federal environmental law preempt state laws that are more 
protective of the environment?15  To use terminology employed by William Buzbee, we 
may distinguish between “floor” and “ceiling” preemption.16 When the federal 
government sets more stringent standards than those adopted at the state or local level, it 
establishes a floor of federal environmental protection that state law cannot lower, but 
leaves the states free to raise the floor by enacting more protective laws.  When federal 
law preempts more stringent or environmentally protective state regulation, it establishes 
a ceiling above which states cannot go, although the law might leave the states free to 
enact less restrictive regulation.  And when federal law completely preempts the field, it 
establishes both a floor and a ceiling. 
 
Floor preemption is inherent in federal environmental law in the sense that (absent 
some express savings clause in the federal law) no state law could, by setting a lower 
state standard, create a defense to a violation of the federal standard.17  In such a case, the 
conflict between federal and state law would be clear and federal law would prevail under 
the Supremacy Clause.18  It is far less clear whether and when ceiling preemption is 
appropriate.19  After all, the more protective state law would not hinder the enforcement 
of the federal standard and would appear to further the environmental goals of the federal 
law.  Of course, no federal statute is intended to achieve environmental protection at all 
                                                 
14
 See generally Glicksman, supra note _, at 781-86; Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change 
in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 254 (2005). 
15
 See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air 
Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Clean Air 
Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003); Ass’n of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Comm’r, Mass. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Prot., 208 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000).  
16
 See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption and the One-Way Ratchet, __ 
N.Y.U. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming). 
17
 Technically, the state law might remain on the books and could be enforced by the state alongside of a 
federal statute even if the state law creates a less protective environmental standard, but this would not 
impede the application of the federal standard and might actually enhance protection of the environment in 
two ways.  First, a state’s enforcement of its laws would increase the likelihood that violators would be 
caught and successfully prosecuted.  Second, if a violation is prosecuted by both the state and federal 
governments, the total penalty would be increased.  Thus, displacing state authority to enforce its own 
environmental regulations as a supplement to federal enforcement would really be a form of ceiling 
preemption. 
18
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
19
 See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (engaging in lengthy 
analysis of whether local ordinance authorizing city to investigate and remediate contamination of soil and 
groundwater by hazardous substances was preempted by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, and concluding that some aspects 
of the local law were preempted, but that others were not).  Compare Welchert v. American Cyanamid, 
Inc., 59 F.3d 69 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that cause of action for breach of express warranty was preempted 
by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y) with Roberson 
v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 863 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (holding that an action for breach of 
express warranty that relies upon statements made on an EPA-approved label is not preempted by FIFRA). 
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costs, and limiting regulatory burdens is always a countervailing concern, but those 
concerns may not justify ceiling preemption.20 
 
We believe that the resolution of environmental preemption issues requires 
careful consideration of the reasons for federal regulation, evaluated in light of collective 
action principles.  In Part I of the article, we develop our framework for considering these 
issues, using traditional preemption doctrine and collective action theory.  In Part II, we 
apply the framework to the regulation of greenhouse gases in response to global climate 
change, demonstrating that the framework is a powerful tool for analyzing the policy and 
legal issues surrounding preemption. 
 
 
I. A Framework for Analyzing Environmental Preemption 
 
Our preemption framework begins with traditional preemption doctrine, from 
which we derive two foundational premises: (1) the purposes of federal regulation are the 
touchstone for preemption analysis; and (2) there should be a strong presumption against 
preemption, in the sense of displacement of state authority.  Starting with these premises, 
the critical question is whether, in a particular case, the purposes of federal environmental 
law provide a sufficiently strong justification to overcome the presumption.  To facilitate 
analysis of that question, we then consider the purposes of federal environmental 
regulation from a collective action perspective, emphasizing that the important purposes 
for preemption analysis reflect collective action problems that distort state regulatory 
incentives so as to justify federal displacement of state regulatory authority.  Finally, we 
consider which federal environmental purposes might justify floor and/or ceiling 
preemption. 
 
A. Preemption Doctrine 
 
It is well known that under the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, federal law is the “supreme Law of the Land.”21  Thus, state laws that 
“retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations” of federal law are 
invalid.22  We think it is important, however, to distinguish the operation of the 
Supremacy Clause to resolve specific conflicts that may arise between state and federal 
law from the broader preemption of state regulatory authority in a given area.  To borrow 
Thomas Merrill’s terminology, in the former instance federal law “trumps” the 
conflicting state law, while in the latter, federal law “displaces” state authority to 
regulate.23 It is the displacement of state authority that concerns us here. 
 
 1. Preemption and Purposes 
 
                                                 
20
 For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
21
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
22
 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819). 
23Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, __ N.W. U. L. REV. ___ (2007). 
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The Supreme Court has constructed a well-established doctrinal approach to 
preemption.24  Under this doctrine, the Court distinguishes among three kinds of 
preemption: “express” preemption, occupation of the field by federal law (“field” or 
“complete” preemption), and preemption because of a conflict between federal and state 
law (“conflict” preemption).  Field preemption and conflict preemption are often grouped 
together under the general rubric “implied” preemption.  Ultimately, the underlying 
purpose of federal regulation is important for all three kinds of preemption.25 
 
As the name suggests, express preemption arises as a result of the explicit 
language of a federal statute.  Assuming that the federal law is valid, its preemptive effect 
is clear and controlled by the scope of the express provision.26  Express preemption 
provisions usually create a negative inference that state laws falling outside the scope of 
the provisions are valid,27 although such an inference is not inevitable.28  Thus, the 
                                                 
24
 E.g., Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992); Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. 
State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Com'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).  For a useful summary of the 
doctrine, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 5.2 (3d ed. 2006).  
Although the current doctrine is not without its critics, see, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of 
Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. (2000), the current 
doctrine appears to be relatively stable and we will take it as a given. 
25
 There remains considerable debate within the Court regarding how to determine legislative purposes.  
See generally John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001) 
(discussing debate within the Supreme Court over the proper approach to statutory construction.).  For 
“textualists” like Justices Scalia and Thomas, the purposes of federal legislation should be determined 
solely on the basis of statutory text (either through an explicit statement of purposes or inferences from the 
language and structure of the statute).  Other members of the Court, however, would also rely on legislative 
history to ascertain congressional purposes.  This debate is directly relevant to how purposes are identified, 
but not to their implications for the analysis of preemption, even if textualists might be inclined to focus 
more heavily on other kinds of inferences from statutory text.  See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388-91 (2000) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the 
majority’s reliance on legislative history and finding the intent of Congress to preempt state law to be 
“perfectly obvious on the face of the statute”); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 616-23 
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing majority’s recourse to and characterization of legislative history 
in concluding that FIFRA did not preempt state common law tort remedies, but reaching the same result 
based upon the language and structure of the act).  In the context of this article, we take no position on this 
debate or on how the statutory purposes relevant to preemption should be identified.   
26
 One might conceive of a circumstance under which Congress has the authority to enact the underlying 
statute, but the inclusion of a preemption provision would be excessive or unrelated to the statutory 
purpose, or would impinge to such an extent on state sovereignty, that it would not be “necessary and 
proper” to a law within the enumerated powers of Congress.  But we are not aware of any cases in which 
the Court has suggested that “unnecessary” or “improper” preemption might be invalid or has struck down 
preemption provisions on such grounds.  Avoiding unnecessary or excessive intrusions on state regulatory 
authority is the principal justification for the presumption against preemption, however.  See infra notes 
___ and accompanying text. 
27
 E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (“Congress' enactment of a provision 
defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.”).  A 
similar inference arises in the reverse situation of a statute containing an express savings provision stating 
that certain state laws are not preempted.  In such cases, the negative inference arises that state laws that do 
not fall within the savings clause are preempted.  See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 
88 (1992); cf. New Mexico v. General Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1233, 1247 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
CERCLA's “comprehensive” liability scheme for natural resource damages preempts state remedies 
designed to achieve something other than the restoration, replacement, or acquisition of a contaminated 
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principal questions in express preemption cases are the scope of the preemption provision 
and whether the state law falls within that scope.29  The scope of the preemption 
provision presents an interpretive question that may be resolved using the traditional tools 
of statutory construction.30  The purposes of the federal legislation are potentially 
relevant to the congressional decision concerning whether and what kinds of state laws to 
preempt and to the judicial determination whether, in the case of an ambiguous 
preemption provision, a particular state or local law should be preempted because it is 
likely to thwart congressional goals.31 
 
Field preemption is a form of implied preemption under which federal law 
completely displaces any state law in a given area – even if there is no apparent 
inconsistency between federal and state law.  The idea is that federal law so completely 
occupies the field that there is no room for any state involvement; in effect, federal law is 
the exclusive law in that field.  Under the standard formulation, field preemption arises –  
 
[1] if a scheme of federal regulation is “so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it,” [2] if “the Act of Congress . . . touch[es] a field in which 
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed 
to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,” or [3] if the 
                                                                                                                                                 
natural resource, notwithstanding CERCLA's saving clauses, because there is no evidence that Congress 
intended to undermine CERCLA's carefully crafted liability scheme through the saving clauses). 
28
 Congress might expressly preempt some laws in order to remove doubt, without necessarily intending to 
save other state laws, leaving other preemption questions to be resolved by traditional doctrine.  Thus, for 
example, a state law outside the scope of the preemption provision might nonetheless conflict with federal 
law.  See, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002) (recognizing the validity of a theory 
that state law that is not expressly preempted might nevertheless be preempted by the entire statute); Geier 
v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (stating that the presence of either a saving clause or an 
express preemption provision “does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles,” such 
as implicit conflict preemption).  Cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244 (1993) (refusing to draw 
negative inference from express retroactivity provision and resolving remaining retroactivity issue through 
judicial retroactivity doctrine). 
29
 See, e.g. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that some, but not all, state 
common law tort claims against cigarette manufacturers fell within the scope of an express preemption 
provision).  The analysis in such cases focuses in the first instance on the statutory text, a focus that is 
shared in cases like Gade in which preemption arises by negative implication from a savings clause and the 
focus is the scope of that clause.  For that reason, it might make sense to group express preemption and 
Gade-type cases together under the rubric “textual” preemption. 
30
 As will be discussed more fully below, in this sense federal preemption issues are part and parcel of a 
larger debate between textualist and intentionalist schools of statutory construction.  See infra notes ___ 
and accompanying text. 
31
 See, e.g., California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U.S. 
316, 325 (1997) (stating that in determining whether a state law is preempted under ERISA’s express 
preemption provision, the Court will look to “‘the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of 
the state law that Congress understood would survive,’ as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law 
on ERISA plans.”).  It is worth noting that Justice Thomas – a strict textualist – quoted this language with 
approval in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001), reinforcing the conclusion that 
statutory purposes are relevant to the scope of express preemption provisions even for textualists on the 
Court.  See supra note ___. 
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goals “sought to be obtained” and the “obligations imposed” reveal a 
purpose to preclude state authority.32 
 
Once it has been determined that federal regulation occupies the field, the question still 
remains whether the state law falls with that field.33  This determination depends on the 
legislative purpose as well, particularly in determining the scope of the occupied field.   
 
The final category of preemption, conflict preemption, may arise in two ways.  
The first is when it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law.  Impossibility 
of compliance is relatively rare, but preemption is clear.  It is important to note that the 
existence of state standards that differ from the federal standards does not always 
implicate impossibility of compliance, if the regulated party can physically comply with 
both standards.34  The second type of conflict preemption occurs when state law is an 
obstacle to the object and purpose of the federal law.35  While some conflicts of this kind 
involve the kind of specific and direct conflict under which federal law “trumps” state 
law,36 this type of conflict preemption is potentially applicable to a broad range of 
situations and may displace a large field of state regulatory authority.37  Again, in the 
absence of a clear and unmistakable conflict, this sort of preemption depends on the 
purposes of federal environmental regulation. 
                                                 
32
 Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (citations omitted, bracketed numbers 
added). 
33
 See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. v. California Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 
(1983) (holding that an economically based moratorium on nuclear power plants was not within the field 
occupied by federal regulation of nuclear power plant safety); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 
238 (1984) (concluding that state common law tort actions were not within the field occupied by federal 
safety regulation of nuclear power plants).  The determination of whether state law falls within the scope of 
a preempted field resembles the determination of whether state law falls within the scope of an express 
preemption provision.  See supra note ___ and accompanying text. 
34
 Thus, for example, if both the federal and state statutes impose emissions limitations (but do not dictate 
the method of compliance) and the state limitations are more stringent that the federal ones, it is not 
impossible to comply with the federal standard because a party who complies with the state standard is also 
necessarily in compliance with the federal standard.  Even if federal and state law require the use of two 
different kinds of emissions control, it may be physically possible to comply be using both.  Impossibility 
of compliance is therefore  rarely implicated in environmental ceiling preemption cases. 
35
 E.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (inquiring whether state law “stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”). 
36
 Consider, for example, the state taxation of a national bank at issue in McCulloch.  See supra notes ___ 
and accompanying text  Unless federal law prohibits the payment of such a tax, it is possible for the bank to 
comply with state law by paying the tax.  Nonetheless, there is a sufficiently clear and direct impairment of 
the bank to “trump” the imposition of the tax. 
37
 If pushed hard enough, field and conflict preemption tend to merge and the doctrine reflects overlapping 
considerations of purpose, since field preemption considers whether congressional goals reveal an intent to 
occupy the field and conflict preemption may arise if state regulation is an obstacle to the accomplishment 
of the federal purpose.  If, for example, there is a congressional purpose to carefully balance environmental 
gains and regulatory burdens and more restrictive state regulation would upset that balance, it could be 
argued both that the goal of balancing reveals an intent to preempt because additional state regulation 
necessarily disrupts the balance struck at the federal level or that state regulation conflicts with federal law 
because it is an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purpose of balancing the desire to achieve 
environmental protection while avoiding excessive regulatory burdens.  In using this example, we do not 
mean to suggest that either argument would or should be successful in any particular case.  See infra notes 
___ and accompanying text. 
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In sum, the purposes of federal regulation are implicated in all three categories of 
preemption.  In express preemption, purposes are relevant to the congressional 
determination of whether and to what extent state authority should be preempted and to 
the judicial construction of the scope of ambiguous express preemption provisions.  For 
field preemption, the purposes of federal regulation are relevant to determining whether 
the field has been occupied and defining the scope of that field.  Finally, the displacement 
of state authority in cases of conflict preemption depends upon a finding that state 
regulation stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal purposes. 
 
 2. The Preemption Presumption 
 
The Court has often stated that there is a presumption against preemption, but its 
scope and force is not entirely clear.38  The presumption against preemption is based 
principally on federalism concerns, but we think those federalism principles are 
reinforced by principles of textualism in statutory construction.  Taken together, we 
believe these principles justify a strong presumption against preemption – at least in the 
context of displacement of state power on the basis of implied preemption. 
 
An essential principle of federalism is that states retain broad sovereign authority 
to regulate for the well being of their people, even if the Constitution contemplates that 
state power will be restricted in some ways and that federal law will be supreme in cases 
of conflict.39  Displacement of this state authority is strong medicine and should not be 
undertaken lightly.  When Congress preempts state law it should have powerful and 
carefully considered justifications for doing so.  By the same token, courts should not 
lightly infer a congressional intent to displace state regulatory authority.  These principles 
underlie the presumption against preemption. 
 
The presumption against preemption can be understood as a drafting principle or 
as a quasi-constitutional clear statement requirement.  As a drafting principle, the 
presumption is a default rule for ambiguous statutes premised on the assumption that 
because Congress respects federalism, it does not ordinarily want to preempt state law.40  
As a quasi-constitutional doctrine, the presumption reflects the “underenforced” 
constitutional norm of federalism that justifies reading ambiguous statutes to avoid 
unnecessary intrusions on traditional areas of state sovereignty.41   
                                                 
38
 See generally CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 111-115 (2004) (discussing the presumption); S. Candice Hoke, 
Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U.L. REV. 685 (1991) (same).  For statistical 
analysis of trends in Supreme Court preemption decisions, see David M. O’Brien, The Supreme Court and 
Intergovernmental Relations: What Happened to Our Federalism?, 9 J. L. & POLITICS 609 (1993). 
39
 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (stating that, “[a]lthough the Constitution grants 
broad powers to Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent 
with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation”). 
40
 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29 (1997); 
Einer Elhauge, Preference Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002). 
41
 See generally, Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
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We also believe that there are powerful arguments related to textualism that 
support a strong presumption against implied displacement of state authority. Congress 
has the authority to expressly preempt state law and its failure to do so is significant.42  
Reading a statute to displace state law in the absence of a textual provision based on 
general statutory purposes is precisely the sort of interpretive methodology that 
textualists criticize.    Indeed, it is plausible to argue that there should be no such thing as 
implied preemption in the sense of displacing state authority.43   
 
As an institutional matter, federalism and textualism are mutually reinforcing 
principles.  By insisting on explicit language to displace state regulatory authority, 
textualism reinforces legislative deliberations.  It ensures that Congress makes a 
conscious choice to displace state regulatory authority that has been approved through the 
constitutional process of bicameralism and presentment.  This ensures in turn that the 
political safeguards of federalism are operative.44 
 
Given its movement toward textualism in other areas, the Court’s ongoing 
reliance on implied preemption doctrine is in some respects remarkable.  Consider, by 
way of analogy, the issue of implied private rights of action.45  Courts in the 1960s and 
1970s were quite willing to further the purposes of federal regulatory statutes by 
interpreting them to create a private right of action, even though the statute itself did not 
expressly provide one.46  Over time, emphasizing the text of the statute and the 
institutional responsibilities of the courts and Congress, the Court reversed course and 
adopted a test so difficult that it is virtually impossible to establish an implied private 
                                                 
42
 In this regard, the distinction between trumping state law and displacing federal authority is significant.  
Congress cannot anticipate every possible state law that might conflict with a federal statute.  If there is a 
specific conflict between federal and state law, the Supremacy Clause mandates that federal law controls, 
whether or not Congress specifically considered and expressly preempted such laws.  Displacement of state 
authority, however, is a more fundamental and far-reaching decision that should be carefully considered 
and approved by Congress. 
43
 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 343, 364-68 
(highlighting recent implied preemption cases that are inconsistent with the rise of textualism in statutory 
interpretation); Paul S. Weiland, Comment, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A 
Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 284-85 (2000) (discussing “limited preemption” model 
under which implied preemption would not be recognized). 
44
 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991).  There is, of course, considerable debate over the 
extent to which the political safeguards of federalism are effective in protecting state interests.  See 
generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).  Nonetheless, the representative structure of Congress is the constitutionally 
designed mechanism for protecting the interest of states in the political process. 
45
 The analogy is apt because both implied preemption and implied rights of action rely on legislative 
purposes to expand the scope and effect of a statute beyond its explicit text, thus achieving through judicial 
interpretation a result for which Congress could have provided expressly, but did not. 
46
 See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
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right of action.47  By the same token, one might argue that implied preemption, in the 
sense of displacement of state regulatory authority, should be extremely rare.48   
 
In any event our framework proceeds on the assumption that there is a strong 
presumption against implied displacement of federal regulatory authority that can only be 
overcome when the statutory language is clear or when clearly articulated statutory 
purposes would be significantly impaired by state regulatory activity.  Given this 
perspective, the question becomes what kinds of purposes would justify ceiling 
preemption in the environmental context.  We address this question in the following two 
sections.   
 
B. The Purposes of Federal Regulation 
 
In this section, we consider the justifications for federal environment regulation, 
using collective action theory to illuminate the analysis.  In the broadest terms, a 
constitutional government is a structure designed to facilitate collective action by 
overcoming transactions costs and other barriers.  Power is delegated to politically 
accountable governmental bodies that make policy decisions on behalf of the collective.  
These regulatory decisions involve an analysis of the costs and benefits to the collective 
of a proposed regulatory policy.49   
 
In our federal system, regulatory decisions can be made at the state or national 
level.50  Because state governments are more directly accountable and more familiar with 
regional conditions, they are generally in a better position than the federal government to 
make policy judgments for their constituencies.51  Federal power is most appropriate 
                                                 
47
 See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1981); 
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
48
 One difference between implied rights of action and preemption is that the decision to create a private 
right of action is one that can be made at the time a statute is adopted, while Congress cannot be expected 
to anticipate every possible conflicting state law that might be adopted.  That is why it is important to 
distinguish the displacement of state authority from the operation of the Supremacy Clause to trump state 
laws where there is a clear and direct conflict.  Federal law trumps conflicting state law whether or not 
Congress anticipates the conflict and provides for it explicitly in a statute.  This kind of conflict, in which 
federal law trumps state law, is broader than the impossibility of compliance strand of conflict preemption.  
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.  The displacement of broad swaths of state authority, however, 
arguably should occur only when explicitly approved by the legislative process. 
49
 This statement is not intended as an endorsement of strict cost-benefit analysis, which has come under 
considerable criticism, as the exclusive test for sound regulatory programs, but rather as reflecting the 
intuitive balancing typically engaged in by policy makers.  For critical examination of cost-benefit analysis, 
see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note __. 
50
 States, of course, also have smaller local governmental units, such as counties and cities. 
51
 See THE POWER TO LEGISLATE, supra note ___, at 88-89.  This is the main justification for the so-called 
“subsidiarity” principles of European Union Law and any United States counterpart that might be thought 
to exist.  See generally George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994); Jared Bayer, Re-balancing Federal and 
State Power: Toward a Political Principle of Subsidiarity in the United States, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1421 
(2004); James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation More Adaptive through Decentralization: 
The Case for Subsidiarity, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1377 (2004).  Of course, there are reasons to be skeptical 
about the ways in which the political campaigns and lobbying may distort the political process, but these 
forces operate at all levels of government, including the federal level. 
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when the cost-benefit analysis of state policy makers is distorted by collective action 
problems.52  This general point is well illustrated by the reasoning of McCulloch v. 
Maryland.53  Although McCulloch is most famous for its recognition of implied federal 
legislative authority and its broad reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause,54 it is also 
a foundational decision for federal preemption.  After upholding the power of Congress 
to charter a national bank, the Court held that the Supremacy Clause prevented the states 
from taxing the bank.  Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court reasoned in part that 
states could not be trusted to tax federal entities because the benefits of such a tax would 
fall to the state exclusively, but the burdens would fall upon all the states.55   
 
This reasoning, which gave rise to the “political process” school of constitutional 
analysis, is essentially an economic argument that reflects a common type of collective 
action problem – externalities.  When a state imposes a tax on a federal entity, the 
benefits of the tax come entirely to that state, while most of the burden of the tax is borne 
by the other states (in the form of a more costly or less effective federal entity). Thus, the 
state is likely to tax excessively in terms of the overall costs and benefits to the collective 
of states.  Moreover, since all other states have a similar incentive to tax federal entities, 
there is a “prisoners’ dilemma” situation: each state has an incentive to overtax the 
federal entity, regardless of what the other states do, even though it would be in the best 
interest of the states as a collective to refrain from doing so.56  Generalizing from this 
analysis, it makes sense to displace state regulatory authority when a collective action 
problem means that the incentives of states will lead to sub-optimal regulatory decisions 
when viewed from the perspective of the United States as a whole.   
                                                 
52
 See generally Federalism and Collective Action, supra note ___, at 1268-70 (discussing implications of 
collective action theory for the scope of federal power).  See also Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, 
Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 191-
94 (2005) (discussing the economics-derived “matching principle” for identifying the appropriate level of 
government to respond to a particular environmental problem). 
53
 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819). 
54
 See generally, e.g., THE POWER TO LEGISLATE, supra note __, at 20-25 (discussing McCulloch and its 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
55
 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 435-36: 
The people of all the states have created the general government, and have conferred 
upon it the general power of taxation. The people of all the states, and the states 
themselves, are represented in congress, and, by their representatives, exercise this 
power. When they tax the chartered institutions of the states, they tax their constituents; 
and these taxes must be uniform. But when a state taxes the operations of the government 
of the United States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their own constituents, but by 
people over whom they claim no control. It acts upon the measures of a government 
created by others as well as themselves, for the benefit of others in common with 
themselves. The difference is that which always exists, and always must exist, between 
the action of the whole on a part, and the action of a part on the whole − between the laws 
of a government declared to be supreme, and those of a government which, when in 
opposition to those laws, is not supreme. 
56
 See generally DOUGLASS BAIRD, ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW ___-___ (19__).  In the prisoners’ 
dilemma scenario, game theorists posit two prisoners, each of whom must decide whether to confess and 
implicate the other in a joint crime, or to remain silent, with the length of their expected sentences 
dependent on their choice and that of the others.  The expected sentences are such that each individual 
prisoner has the incentive to cut a deal by confessing and implicating the other, but the best result from the 
perspective of the two, taken together, is to remain silent.   
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In this section, we apply that perspective to environmental regulation.  In the 
broadest sense, the purpose of environmental regulation is to combat the so-called 
tragedy of the commons, a collective action problem that causes shared resources to be 
over-utilized.57  The tragedy of the commons explains why environmental regulation may 
be necessary, but from the federalism perspective the question is whether that regulation 
is best undertaken at the federal or state level (or even local level).  Federal 
environmental regulation is most justified when collective action problems create 
incentives that would distort policy outcomes if states act individually.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that the traditional justifications for federal environmental regulation, which 
include negative environmental externalities, resource pooling, the “race to the bottom,” 
uniform standards, and the “NIMBY” (not in my back yard) phenomenon, all reflect 
collective action problems for states. 
 
1.  Negative Externalities.  The most obvious and broadly accepted justification 
for federal environmental regulation is that state and local governments can externalize 
(or allow private entities operating within their jurisdiction to externalize) environmental 
harms,58 particularly air and water pollution.  Air and water pollution move downwind or 
downstream across political boundaries.59  Thus, state and local governments in upwind 
and upstream states may enjoy the economic and tax benefits of pollution-causing 
activities while exporting the burdens to other states, creating incentives to permit 
pollution-causing activities that result in a net loss to the United States as a whole.60   
 
                                                 
57
 This includes pollution, insofar as pollution-causing activities involve overutilization of a commons – 
clean air and water.  See, e.g., RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING 
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 2-3 (1999) (arguing that “government 
involvement in environmental issues is both necessary and inevitable,” inter alia, to protect environmental 
assets from “tragedies of the commons” and to assign and enforce property rights to eliminate commons 
resources and create use rights and protection duties); ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 8-9 (5th ed. 2007) (“The commons dilemma is often argued to provide the 
basis for severe government restrictions on the use of natural sinks for waste disposal or ecosystems for 
commodity production.”).  For the classic description of the commons problem, see Garrett Hardin, The 
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
58
 Externalities are spillover costs imposed on persons other than those who produce them and therefore not 
taken into account by those who produce them.  Government regulation is one way to force those who 
impose spillover costs to internalize them.  See, e.g., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, 
REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 52-53 (3d ed. 2003). 
59
 See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note __, at 85 (“Perhaps the most widely accepted rationale for federal 
over state environmental standard setting is pollution externalities that move interstate.”).  See generally 
Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of 
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1210, 1215 (1977) (discussing how interstate “spillovers . . . 
generate conflicts and welfare losses not easily remedied under a decentralized regime”); Thomas Merrill, 
Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931 (1997); Richard Revesz, Federalism and 
Interstate Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996). 
60
 While downstream or downwind states have a corresponding incentive to over-regulate pollution causing 
activities in upstream or upwind states, they lack the legal authority to do so.  See infra notes ___ and 
accompanying text.   
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Some of the earliest federal pollution control programs responded to this kind of 
interstate air and water pollution externality.61  Congress justified its decision to authorize 
federal regulation of activities that contribute to interstate pollution by referring to the 
need for federal intervention in the face of state failures to take effective abatement 
actions.62  A House report on an early piece of air pollution legislation stated, for 
example, that “many aspects of air pollution are − and will remain − inherently beyond 
the reach of State and local agencies,” including interstate air pollution.63  A House report 
on the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act made the point even more clearly: “air 
pollution does not confine itself to State boundaries.  Therefore, if one State wants 
cleaner air and its neighboring State wants to permit more pollution which would prevent 
the first State from achieving its objectives, some Federal policy is necessary to resolve 
interstate disputes.”64 
 
2.  Resource Pooling.  One advantage of collective action is the pooling of 
resources, which can be especially advantageous to the collective if there are economies 
of scale or synergistic effects.  In the context of federalism, the pooling of resources to 
provide a common defense or improve bargaining power in international relations is a 
well-accepted premise for federal authority.65  The advantages of resource pooling are a 
quintessential “public good,” which in collective action terms creates an incentive for 
                                                 
61
 See, e.g., the Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903; Robert V. Percival, 
Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1157 
(1995) (describing 1963 federal legislation, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963), that was directed at 
interstate air pollution); H.R. REP. NO. 90-728 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1938, 1944 (stating 
that  “[t]he Clean Air Act of 1963 marked the beginning of a new and much more hopeful era in air 
pollution control” that for the first time provided authority “for Federal regulatory action to abate interstate 
air pollution problems”). 
62
 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 90-728 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1938, 1947 (explaining that if “a 
State fails to take appropriate action, the Department [of Health, Education, and Welfare] is empowered 
under the bill to take the necessary action to protect health and welfare expected of the State, particularly 
where interstate pollution is involved”). 
63
 H.R. REP. NO. 89-2170 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3473, 3476. 
64
 H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 151 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1230.  See also id. at 329-
30, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1408-09 (citing the inadequacy of existing mechanisms for dealing 
with interstate air pollution problems to justify enhancement of federal regulatory authority); Solid Waste 
Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 195 (2001) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (objecting to the majority’s narrow reading of the Clean Water Act’s dredge and fill permit 
program because “the destruction of aquatic migratory bird habitat, like so many other environmental 
problems, is an action in which the benefits (e.g., a new landfill) are disproportionately local, while many 
of the costs (e.g., fewer migratory birds) are widely dispersed and often borne by citizens living in other 
States.  In such situations, described by economists as involving ‘externalities,’ federal regulation is both 
appropriate and necessary.”).  Cf. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, H.R. REP. NO. 84-
1446 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3023, 3024  (stating that “[r]egulatory authority at the Federal 
level should be limited to interstate pollution problems and used on a standby basis only for serious 
situations which are not resolved through State and interstate collaboration”). 
65
 In the international relations field, this rationale has often translated into a particularly strong tendency to 
find preemption, and perhaps a presumption in favor of preemption.  See American Ins. Ass'n v. 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that California law designed to force foreign insurers to disclose 
records concerning insurance for Holocaust victims was impliedly preempted by presidential executive 
agreements); Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that Massachusetts 
law prohibiting state agencies from doing business with companies doing business with Burma (Myanmar) 
was preempted by federal law imposing sanctions on Burma). 
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each state to free ride on the efforts of others.66  As a structural response to such 
incentives, the federal government represents the pooled resources of the states and thus 
has superior resources to the individual states.  The superiority of federal resources has 
often been cited as a reason for federal environmental regulation.67   
 
To some extent, this justification may be based on efficiencies in generating 
scientific and technical information or superior federal technical expertise.68  Thus, for 
example, Congress has relied upon the federal government’s superior resource base as a 
rationale for vesting federal agencies with responsibilities to gather and disseminate 
information needed to make regulatory decisions.69  Indeed, some of the earliest federal 
legislative endeavors in the pollution control arena authorized federal research into the 
causes and effects of pollution or authorized federal technical and financial assistance to 
state regulators.70  These advantages, however, only justify a federal role in generating 
                                                 
66
 See supra note 1. 
67
 According to one account: 
Where effective regulation will require substantial investigation of technological 
capabilities, or links between pollutants and health impacts, or comprehensive assessment 
of diverse jurisdictions’ pollution control efforts, economies of scale will favor a federal 
role.  Otherwise, no individual state will have incentives to gather these sorts of valuable 
information, and all states will be tempted to free ride on any state that makes such an 
investment.  Federal leadership also reduces the risk of duplicative regulatory 
investigation.  For this reason, federal gathering and creation of information about 
pollution impacts and pollution control has long been part of federal environmental laws. 
GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note __, at 86. Cf. Rena Steinzor & Margaret Clune, Paper Tigers and Killer Air: 
How Weak Enforcement Leaves Communities Vulnerable to Smog 9-11 (Nov. 2006), available at 
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/publications.cfm (documenting that chronically under-funded states 
were not performing required inspections under the CAA). 
68
 A similar phenomenon may apply with respect to lobbying activities, as to which resource pooling may 
permit interest groups to more effectively develop and transmit information through the lobbying process at 
the federal level.  See generally JAMES M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY ___-___ (1984) 
(discussing the roles of interest groups and lobbying).  There are, of course, other factors at work, such as 
the relative ease or difficulty of lobbying multiple state and or local policy makers, as opposed to a single 
set of policy makers at the national level, which may be geographically remote.  See, e.g., Robert L. 
Glicksman & Stephen Chapman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach of) the Contract with America, 5-Wtr. 
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 21 (1996) (noting that “the proponents of regulation, such as public interest 
groups, may not have the resources to lobby successfully in fifty jurisdictions rather than one”).  These 
differences may mean that regulation at the state or federal level works to the benefit or detriment of 
lobbying by environmental or industry groups, depending on the circumstances. 
69
 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 89-2170 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3473, 3476 (stating that among 
the other air pollution problems that are “inherently beyond the reach of State and local agencies” were “the 
various research and development problems that still remain to be solved.  The Federal Government must 
be prepared to meet these increasing needs for assistance to State and local governments and action at the 
Federal level.”); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, H.R. REP. NO. 87-306 (1961), 
reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2079 (“Research has always been recognized as a basic Federal 
water pollution control responsibility. The need for a much greater Federal research effort was consistently 
recognized during the hearings on the bill.”). 
70
 See, e.g., An Act to Improve, Strengthen, and Accelerate Programs for the Prevention and Abatement of 
Air Pollution, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963); An Act to Provide Research and Technical 
Assistance Relating to Air Pollution Control, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955). 
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information and disseminating it to the states and do not provide particularly powerful 
reasons for federal regulation on the basis of that information.71   
 
The more powerful justification relates to superior enforcement resources, in 
which the advantages of resource pooling are conceptually related to cartelization and 
collective bargaining and analogous to the arguments for federal authority in the field of 
military and foreign relations matters.72  One recent example in which the federal 
government’s resource superiority has provided a rationale for federal regulatory 
implementation and enforcement relates to the Superfund law.73  There has been concern 
that the states do not have adequate resources to supervise remediation of “mega-sites” 
contaminated with hazardous substances and that the federal government is better 
equipped to do so.74 
 
3.  Race to the Bottom.  Another rationale for federal environmental regulation is 
the so-called “race to the bottom.”75  A race to the bottom assumes that competition for 
business and industry will create a prisoner’s dilemma scenario in which states are driven 
to relax their environmental standards in order to gain the economic benefits and tax 
revenues that the business or industry brings.  Individual states have the incentives to 
lower standards to compete for industry regardless of what other states do,76 even though 
the states as a collective would be better off not doing so.  Some environmental law 
scholars have argued either that the race to the bottom is not an empirical reality or that 
interjurisdictional competition is a good thing because it tends to produce socially 
                                                 
71
 Further, superior federal expertise because of superior resources proves too much as an argument for 
federal as opposed to state regulation, because it would apply to virtually every area of government 
activity.  Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (rejecting argument that adverse effect on 
national productivity resulting from guns in schools provided a basis for federal regulation under the 
commerce power because that argument proved too much). 
72
 As will be discussed further infra notes ___ and accompanying text, the international dimensions of 
global climate change has been an important argument in favor of ceiling preemption with respect to GHG 
emissions, but this aspect of resource pooling was not a significant factor in the adoption of  major federal 
environmental laws.  
73
 To take a dramatic illustration, a state like Kansas might lack resources to effectively tackle a large 
multinational corporation like Exxon or DuPont, just as it would be relatively weak if acting alone when 
dealing with other countries diplomatically or confronting them militarily.  The United States has the 
pooled resources of all the states and is in a much stronger position. 
74
 See, e.g., Marla Cone, When Superfund Expenses Go Mega, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2007. 
75
 The race-to-the-bottom argument came to prominence as a critique of the influence of Delaware’s law of 
corporations, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663 (1974), but it appeared earlier in Supreme Court decisions upholding portions of the Social 
Security Act.  Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937) (reasoning that federal old age insurance was 
justified because “states and local governments are at times reluctant to increase so heavily the burden of 
taxation to be borne by their residents for fear of placing themselves in a position of economic disadvantage 
as compared with neighbors or competitors”); Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 
(1937) (reasoning that federal unemployment compensation was necessary because “[m]any [states] held 
back through alarm lest in laying such a toll upon their industries, they would place themselves in a 
position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors”). 
76
 If other states do not lower standards, an individual state is in a superior position to attract industry, while 
if other states do lower standards, then the state must lower its own standards in order to compete 
effectively. 
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efficient outcomes.77  Other academics have responded that the race to the bottom has 
been and remains a factor that provides obstacles to effective state environmental 
regulation.78 
 
Regardless of the academic debates, Congress has relied on the race to bottom as 
a rationale for federal action,79 explicitly adverting to the fear that states would lower 
environmental standards to compete for industry to justify federal regulatory authority to 
control pollution.  A House report on the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act provides 
a clear illustration: 
 
[T]here is a strong national interest in not encouraging industries to go 
forum shopping, seeking to locate new plants in areas which allow the 
greatest pollution.  If there is no Federal policy, States may find 
themselves forced into a bidding war to attract new industry by reducing 
pollution standards.  This would result in the squandering of finite air 
resources, thereby limiting the potential for long-term economic growth.  
This clearly is contrary to the national interest.80 
 
Preventing a race to the bottom has also been recognized and endorsed by the Supreme 
Court as an appropriate purpose for federal environmental regulation.  
 
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,81 the Court 
characterized the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act82 as a response “to a 
congressional finding that nationwide ‘surface mining and reclamation standards are 
essential in order to insure that competition in interstate commerce among sellers of coal 
produced in different States will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States 
to improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining operations within their 
borders.’”83  The Court added that “[t]he prevention of this sort of destructive interstate 
competition is a traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause,” 
and found that the application of that rationale to the environmentally destructive effects 
                                                 
77
 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race to the Bottom" 
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); Richard L. Revesz, The 
Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 
(1997); Jonathan Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 
139 (2005) (asserting that “claims that federal regulation is necessary to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ are 
questionable on both theoretical and empirical grounds”). 
78
 See, e.g., Kirsten Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the 
Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 570 (1996); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures 
in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (1996). 
79
 See, e.g., Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937). 
80
 H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 51-52 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1230-31. 
81
 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
82
 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328. 
83
 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 281-82 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g)). 
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of surface coal mining was a sufficient basis for invoking Congress’s authority to create a 
federal regulatory program under the authority vested in it by the Commerce Clause.84 
 
4.  Uniform Standards.  A fourth justification for federal environmental regulation 
emphasizes the need for uniform standards.  This rationale resonates with the original 
justifications for the federal commerce power and the need for uniformity in traditional 
“dormant” Commerce Clause and field preemption doctrine.85  In economic terms, 
uniform standards reduce transactions costs for regulated entities such as product 
manufacturers and distributors, particularly for commodities in interstate commerce.86  
Although it is possible for states acting independently to develop uniform standards 
through harmonization of laws, it is very difficult and unusual for these results to be fully 
achieved.87 
 
Congress clearly enunciated the view that uniform federal pollution standards 
would reduce the transaction costs of regulated entities when it decided in the 1960s to 
regulate automotive emissions.  A 1965 Senate committee report explained: 
 
In view of the fact that the automobile is one of the principal sources of air 
pollution and manufacturers have the capability of incorporating air 
pollution reduction facilities in their vehicles, there is no apparent reason 
                                                 
84
 Id. at 282.  Accord Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding the application of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) to a species located in one state): 
The Supreme Court has recognized that protection of natural resources may require 
action from Congress.  This general point holds true where endangered species are 
concerned.  Species conservation may unfortunately impose additional costs on private 
concerns.  States may decide to forego or limit conservation efforts in order to lower 
these costs, and other states may be forced to follow suit in order to compete.  The 
Supreme Court has held that Congress may take cognizance of this dynamic and arrest 
the “race to the bottom” in order to prevent interstate competition whose overall effect 
would damage the quality of the national environment. 
See also Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (arguing that 
“[a]pplication of the ESA to habitat degradation has a further impact on interstate commerce by removing 
the incentives for states ‘to adopt lower standards of endangered species protection in order to attract 
development,’ thereby preventing a destructive ‘race to the bottom’”). 
85
 See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1853) (“Whatever subjects of [the commerce] power 
are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to 
be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.”). 
86
 Kirsten Engel has noted that “[u]niform standards are of great benefit to industry, especially industries 
producing polluting products.  Not only do they eliminate competition, but they free industries whose 
products have a national market from having to comply with fifty different standards as opposed to a single 
national standard.”  Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It 
“to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 369 (1997).  Cf. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and 
Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV.73, 142 (1997) (addressing, in a 
different regulatory context, “the broad and general claim that the predictability and reduced transaction 
costs afforded by uniform, nationally-imposed legal standards generally outweigh the benefits of 
federalism's diversity”).  In this sense, “uniformity” as a purpose for federal environmental regulation is 
more concerned with reducing regulatory burdens than improving the effectiveness of environmental 
regulation.  See infra notes ___ and accompanying text (discussing uniformity and reduction of regulatory 
burdens as a basis for ceiling preemption in the global climate change context). 
87
 The most notable example in the United States may well be the Uniform Commercial Code. 
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why the entire Nation should not benefit from such advances.  Also, it 
would be more desirable to have national standards rather than for each 
State to have a variation in standards and requirements which could result 
in chaos insofar as manufacturers, dealers, and users are concerned.88 
 
Indeed, the committee justified its decision to prohibit the states from adopting their own 
controls on emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines by 
asserting that “a provision such as this is necessary in order to prevent a chaotic situation 
from developing in interstate commerce in new motor vehicles.”89   
 
Two years later, a House committee report recognized that if states were allowed 
to impose their own controls, the auto manufacturers would be able to meet any diverse 
standards that resulted from this authorization by manufacturing vehicles that comply 
with the most stringent controls, federal or state.  It found this solution objectionable, 
however: 
 
While manufacturers could meet [the] problems [stemming from separately issued 
and administered standards] by building vehicles that meet whichever standard is 
the more stringent, this would lead to increased costs to consumers nationwide, 
with benefit only to those in one section of the country. 
 
The committee therefore decided to provide for uniform administration of 
standards for motor vehicle emissions, by providing that the Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare shall administer the program of control of automotive 
emissions.90 
 
Congress has relied on similar concerns to justify authorization of federal regulatory 
standards for other environmentally damaging activities.91 
                                                 
88
 S. REP. NO. 89-192, at 6 (1965). 
89
 Id. at 8. 
90
 Air Quality Act of 1967, H.R. REP. NO. 90-728 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1938, 1958.  In 
effect, the state imposing the highest standards can, to some degree, externalize the economic burdens of its 
environmental regulations onto other states, in much the same way that a tax on a federal entity externalizes 
its costs.  See infra notes ___ and accompanying text (discussing the ability of states to externalize the 
economic burdens of regulation). 
91
 See, e.g., Hazardous Materials Transportation Act Uniform Safety Act Amendments of 1990, H.R. REP. 
NO. 101-441, pt. 1, at ___ (1990) (stating that “[t]he Committee believes conflicting designations by non-
Federal entities would undermine the consistency needed to promote uniform requirements for all 
hazardous materials”); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (explaining that Congress 
decided to preempt state packaging and labeling requirements for pesticides that differ from those adopted 
by EPA under FIFRA because “competing state labeling requirements . . . would create significant 
inefficiencies for manufacturers”).  In Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 502 (4th Cir. 2000), the court 
explained that “[a] desire for uniform standards also spurred enactment of the ESA.”  The court quoted 
from the legislative history of the ESA: “[P]rotection of endangered species is not a matter that can be 
handled in the absence of coherent national and international policies: the results of a series of unconnected 
and disorganized policies and programs by various states might well be confusion compounded.”  Id. 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-415, at 5 (1973)).  The court refused to strike down the particular application of 
the ESA involved in that case because of its fear that leaving environmental regulation in general to the 
states “might well subject interstate companies to a welter of conflicting obligations.  If Congress is 
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5. NIMBY.  The NIMBY phenomenon arises when there is some undesirable but 
necessary activity or facility that must be located somewhere: people want one to exist, 
but “not in my back yard.”  In the environmental arena, states typically want to avoid 
becoming the location of a necessary, but environmentally damaging, activity.  In such 
cases, states may impose regulatory burdens intended to drive the activity into other 
states.  This scenario is essentially the flip side of a negative externality problem, because 
the source of a NIMBY problem is a positive externality – the state that is the location of 
the activity bears all or most of the environmental burdens, but the economic benefits are 
spread to other states.   
 
Perhaps the best example of the adoption of federal environmental regulation as a 
response to the NIMBY problem concerns the location of radioactive waste disposal 
facilities.  The efforts of both federal and state governments “to force hated facilities on 
terrified communities” spawned “a genuine political crisis − hundreds of battles have 
raged around the country, some dethroning elected officials, and some verging on 
violence.”92  Although the entire nation benefits from the production of nuclear power 
and the research and medical facilities that generate radioactive waste, few communities 
want to expose their citizens to the health risks they would experience by living or 
working in proximity to a radioactive waste disposal site.  By the late 1970s, only three 
states (South Carolina, Nevada, and Washington) operated low-level radioactive waste 
disposal sites and officials in those states expressed frustration over the burdens placed 
on those states by being forced to accept low-level wastes generated throughout the 
nation.93  Because no other states volunteered to construct new sites, Congress decided 
that a federal solution was necessary; it adopted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Act of 1980 (LLRWPA)94 to distribute the environmental burdens of waste disposal more 
equitably.95  The strength of the NIMBY phenomenon is illustrated by the aftermath of 
                                                                                                                                                 
constitutionally forbidden from even enacting uniform environmental rules, the confusion for interstate 
commercial enterprises might increase exponentially.”  Id. 
92
 Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A 
Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TULANE L. REV.1047, 1052 (1994).  See also Barry 
G. Rabe, NIMBY and Maybe: Conflict and Cooperation in Siting of Low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal 
Facilities in the United States and Canada, 24 ENVTL. L. 67, 69 (1994) (claiming that “[f]acility siting and 
management has been transformed from a fairly consensual area of environmental policy in the 1960s and 
1970s to a conflict ridden area” and that, “[t]ime and again, when either Canadian or American 
communities are confronted with the possibility of ‘hosting’ a new waste disposal or storage facility, the 
political reaction is immediate and intense,” and “has blocked construction of any new facilities in either 
nation”). 
93
 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149-51 (1992); Robert L. Glicksman, Interstate Compacts 
for Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal: A Mechanism for Excluding Out-of-State Waste, in LOW-
LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION: SCIENCE, POLITICS AND FEAR 63 (Michael E. Burns ed., 1988).  
For analysis of New York v. United States, see generally Richard E. Levy, New York v. United States: An 
Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal 
Power, 41 U. KAN. L. REV.493 (1993). 
94
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d.  The 1980 Act was amended in 1986.  Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 
(1986). 
95
 The LLRWPA declared that “each State is responsible for providing for the availability of capacity either 
within or outside the State for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders.”  42 
U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(1)(A).  See also Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, H.R. 
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New York v. United States,96 which invalidated the most stringent enforcement provisions 
of the act, as states and local communities continue to struggle and litigate against 
hosting a site.97 
 
A similar pattern has manifested itself with respect to other kinds of facilities, 
including hazardous, solid, and biomedical waste management facilities,98 and other 
kinds of potentially dangerous activities, such as hazardous waste transportation.  
Congress often reacted by establishing federal standards or otherwise taking the power to 
exclude objectionable facilities out of the hands of state and local decisionmakers.99  
Despite the federal government’s intervention, some of the battles waged by the states 
selected to host undesirable activities have been protracted.100 
 
Each of these five justifications for federal environmental regulation reflects a 
kind of collective action problem that would tend to prevent states, acting as individual 
entities, from adopting and implementing appropriate environmental policies.  Federal 
action is a means of overcoming those problems.  Federal regulation overcomes the 
perverse incentives resulting from states’ ability to externalize environmental harms 
because the full costs of those harms are felt by the nation as a whole.101  The benefits of 
resource pooling are a classic public goods scenario that requires collective action to 
overcome free rider problems.  The race to the bottom requires collective action to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rep. No. 99-314, pt. 2, at 14 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002, 3002 (stating that Congress 
adopted the LLRWPA in 1980 “in order to lift the national burden of disposal from the three states with the 
only remaining commercial facilities”). 
96
 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
97
 In one instance, for example, a court held that a state that was selected as the host state for a multi-state 
compact’s disposal site breached its good faith obligation under compact by exhibiting a lack of diligence 
or cooperative effort in processing a license for the facility, willfully rendering imperfect performance, and 
denying the application without regard to its technical merits.  Entergy Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska, 358 
F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2004), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 366 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2004). 
98
 See Rabe, supra note __, at 69.  See also Report on the Activity of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce for the 101st Congress, H.R. REP. No. 101-1021, at __ (1991) (stating that “[d]isposal capacity 
is diminishing even as the amount of waste produced continues to grow,” that “[l]andfills are closing for 
environmental and regulatory reasons or because they have been filled to capacity,” and that “[c]ommunity 
opposition has made the siting of new landfills a difficult process, exacerbating the capacity shortage”). 
99
 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act requiring that EPA 
set minimum standards for the design, construction, and operation of facilities for the treatment, storage, 
and disposal of hazardous waste); Tennessee v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 328 F.3d 729, 730-31 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (describing the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act , 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5127, as “an effort 
to create a coherent approach to addressing the problems posed by the interstate transportation of hazardous 
material”). 
100
 See, e.g., Nevada v. Department of Energy, 457 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 
1545 (9th Cir. 1990).  Some of these battles are ongoing.  See, e.g., Lucy Kafanov, Toxic Waste: N.J. 
Senators Move to Block Radioactive Waste Dump, ENERGY & ENV’T DAILY, Jan. 26, 2007, available at 
http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/print/2007/01/26/7. 
101
 Of course, the United States can and does externalize environmental harms to other countries, and in 
that sense only global policy making bodies – a larger collective of which the United States is part – would 
consider the full environmental cost of some environmentally damaging activities.  This point would tend 
to reinforce the importance of international environmental law as a tool of environmental policy.  For 
purposes of allocating regulatory responsibility at the state or federal level, however, the full environmental 
costs to be considered are those that affect the United States. 
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overcome the prisoners’ dilemma situation under which the incentives for states acting 
independently would produce sub-optimal outcomes for the states as a collective.  
Federal standards substantially reduce transaction costs for regulated entities by 
establishing uniform standards.  Federal regulation overcomes the NIMBY problem when 
individual states have incentives to avoid bearing certain environmental costs inherent in 
modern society (such as waste disposal or the generation of electricity), while benefiting 
from the location of the relevant cost-generating activities in other states.  
 
C. Collective Action Problems and Preemption 
 
As the discussion to this point indicates, the central question in environmental 
preemption cases is whether the purposes underlying the federal law justify the 
displacement of state authority.  From the collective action perspective, the answer 
depends on how the particular collective action problem at issue affects the incentives of 
states.  The case for displacing state regulatory authority is strongest with respect to those 
areas in which the state’s regulatory actions are symptomatic of the collective action 
problems that justify federal action. The preemptive effect of federal legislation should be 
assessed with this principle in mind. 
 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that environmental policy making 
inevitably involves some balancing of environmental benefits against regulatory costs, 
including burdens on economic activity and enforcement costs.102  These countervailing 
concerns may be more or less explicit in the text or history of a statute, but in view of the 
countervailing costs there is always some upper limit to the expectations of 
environmental protection.103  Just as collective action problems can distort a state’s 
assessment of environmental costs and benefits, so too might a state’s assessment of 
regulatory burdens be distorted by collective action problems.  Thus, any full assessment 
of the implications of collective action analysis for environmental preemption must be 
concerned with both sides of the environmental policy cost-benefit analysis. 
 
 1. Combating Under-Regulation by States 
 
The collective action perspective has important implications for the issue of 
ceiling preemption, because not all of the collective action problems to which federal 
environmental regulation responds support ceiling preemption to the same degree.  When 
federal regulation is premised upon negative interstate externalities, superior federal 
                                                 
102
 We are grateful to Steve Ware and Chris Drahozal, our colleagues at the University of Kansas, for 
making this point forcefully at a faculty colloquium. 
103
 David Driesen has argued that the feasibility principle often reflected in environmental regulation 
“requires stringent regulation, but presumptively subjects this demand for stringency to two constraints. 
First, the principle authorizes government agencies to forego physically impossible environmental 
improvements.  Second, the principle authorizes government agencies to forego constraints so costly that 
they cause widespread plant shutdowns.”  David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, 
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005).  Thus, even feasibility standards, such as the one at issue in 
Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), and Am. Textile Mfrs. 
Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981), draw the limit at the destruction of an industry. 
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resources, or the race to the bottom, the collective action problems that call for action at 
the federal level can be expected to result in inadequate or insufficient regulation at the 
state level.  In these situations, moreover, there is ordinarily not a countervailing negative 
economic externality that would create incentives for states to regulate excessively.  
Thus, federal environmental regulation to combat these kinds of collective action 
problems might support floor preemption, but would not ordinarily support ceiling 
preemption. 
 
The negative externalities justification for federal intervention provides a clear 
example of this result.104  If a state can externalize environmental harms because, for 
example, pollution created by industry in that state flows downstream or downwind into 
other states, the result we would expect is under-regulation by the state of origin.  The 
state can reap the economic benefits of the industrial activity without experiencing the 
harms (or at least all of the harms).  These concerns would potentially justify floor 
preemption if laxer state standards impair the operation of stricter federal ones.105  But if 
– contrary to expectations – the state imposes stricter environmental protection measures, 
the collective action problem giving rise to regulation at the federal level is not an issue. 
 
 When a state imposes stricter environmental protection measures, moreover, it 
does not ordinarily create a corresponding negative regulatory externality.106  If a state 
                                                 
104
 We do not mean to suggest that Congress could not decide to impose ceiling preemption under a statute 
combating externalities, but rather that the case for doing so is weak from a collective action perspective.  
Thus, Congress should not take this step lightly and courts should not ordinarily infer such preemption in 
the absence of express statutory provisions.  See infra notes ___ and accompanying text (discussing basic 
principles derived from this framework). 
105
 Note that enforcement of laxer state standards in addition to stricter federal ones might actually increase 
the level of environmental protection by imposing larger total penalties or increasing the likelihood of 
sanctions for the most serious violations.  On the other hand, if a state enforcement action precluded 
subsequent enforcement action at the federal level, the state would have incentives to pursue weak 
sanctions as a means of shielding local polluters from more aggressive federal sanctions.  Cf. State Water 
Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 261 Va. 209, 542 S.E.2d 766 (2001) (holding that enforcement of 
state pollution laws was barred by principles of res judicata following federal enforcement action based on 
the same pollution offense).  For this reason perhaps, the Supreme Court has held that state prosecutions for 
crimes that would violate federal laws do not bar subsequent federal prosecutions. See, e.g., United States 
v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 385 (1922) (observing in the context of Prohibition that state prosecutions were a 
bar to federal prosecution, “a state [could] punish the manufacture, transportation and sale of intoxicating 
liquor by small or nominal fines, [and] the race of offenders to the courts of that state to plead guilty and 
secure immunity from federal prosecution for such acts would not make for respect for the federal statute or 
for its deterrent effect”). 
106
 The principal exception to this proposition is the regulation of pollution causing goods that move in 
interstate commerce, insofar as regulation of products sold in one state may burden their production in 
another.  See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (upholding state law 
prohibiting the use of plastic containers for milk even though the law imposed economic burdens on out-of-
state interests); Procter and Gamble v. Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir 1975) (upholding municipal ban on 
laundry detergents with phosphates).  In such cases, however, there is some political process safeguard 
because producers in the state are also subject to the restriction and the citizens of the state bear some of the 
economic costs in the form of higher prices or less desirable products.  This kind of regulatory externality is 
closely aligned with the uniformity problem, see supra notes ___ and accompanying text (discussing this 
problem in relation to vehicle emissions), and its implications for preemption will be discussed in that 
context.  See infra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
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regulates pollution-causing activities within the state, both the economic burdens and the 
environmental benefits are felt within the state and the political process safeguards the 
weighing of regulatory costs and benefits.107  It is true that downstream or downwind 
states might have incentives to over-regulate pollution-causing activity in other states, 
thus reaping the environmental benefits while externalizing the economic costs.108  But 
states generally lack the authority to regulate pollution-causing activities in other 
states.109  Thus, negative externalities might justify floor preemption, but they would not 
justify ceiling preemption. 
 
In a similar manner, federal intervention premised on resource pooling responds 
to the concern that states cannot or will not protect the environment because they lack the 
resources to develop and enforce standards.  Thus, with one notable exception (discussed 
below), resource pooling provides little justification for displacing state regulatory 
authority.110  The gains from resource pooling are achieved by regulating at the federal 
level whether or not the states retain concurrent regulatory and enforcement authority.  
For example, if (contrary to congressional expectations) the state in which a mega-
Superfund site is located commits sufficient resources to remediate the site,111 preemption 
of the state’s ability to control the remediation process cannot legitimately be premised 
on the federal government’s general resource superiority. 
 
The exception to this reasoning is when the national government is “bargaining” 
over environmental regulation and enforcement with another party, either in terms of 
international treaties or settlement of enforcement actions.112  In those circumstances if 
the states were to pursue independent actions it could weaken the bargaining position of 
the national government.113  If so, the purposes that justify regulating at the national level 
                                                 
107
 Of course, economic activity within a state benefits other states as well, and in that sense regulation of 
in-state activity externalizes some economic burdens (as well as environmental benefits because there will 
be less pollution moving into other states).  In an extreme case, this becomes a NIMBY problem.  See 
supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
108
 These incentives might manifest themselves in over-regulation at the federal level if states can 
concentrate the economic burdens of environmental protection in a few states, thus externalizing a great 
deal of those costs while reaping the environmental benefits.  This sort of concern is inherent in any federal 
system, and is one reason why legislation must meet bicameralism and presentment requirements.  See THE 
POWER TO LEGISLATE, supra note ___, at 86 (discussing collective action implications of bicameralism and 
presentment).  
109
 See, e.g., Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1999); Nat’l Solid Wastes 
Mgmt. Ass’n v. Charter County, 303 F. Supp. 2d 835 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
110
 As in the case of externalities, however, if compliance with state standards or the pursuit of state 
enforcement actions served as a defense to federal enforcement of federal standards, under the Supremacy 
Clause, the federal standards and enforcement would prevail.  See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
111
 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
112
 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (providing that a person who has resolved its liability to the United States or 
a state in a settlement is not liable for claims for contribution under CERCLA).  Many of the citizen suit 
provisions in the federal pollution control statutes bar citizen suits commenced while EPA or a state is 
diligently prosecuting alleged violations.  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (Clean Water Act). 
113
 This is one argument that has been advanced against state regulation of greenhouse gases.  See infra 
notes ___ and accompanying text. 
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would tend to support exclusive federal control; i.e., both floor and ceiling preemption.114  
The Court has recognized these concerns outside of the environmental law context in 
cases involving sensitive foreign policy negotiations.115 
 
There does not appear to be any significant countervailing need to pool resources 
to prevent over-regulation.  When individual states do act to protect the environment, the 
absence of economies of scale and synergistic effects from resource pooling would not 
seem to foster excessive regulation or enforcement.116  It is true that regulation and 
enforcement by states along side of the federal government would increase regulatory 
burdens, but resource pooling does not point to any systematic skewing of incentives that 
would suggest a reason to displace the authority of states to draw a different balance than 
the national government. 
 
Like externalities and resource pooling, the race-to-the-bottom rationale posits a 
concern that states have incentives to under-regulate in the field of environmental 
protection.  Thus, this rationale might support floor preemption to the extent that 
concurrent state regulation impairs the effectiveness of federal law.117  But it does not 
support ceiling preemption. 
 
Consider the example of surface coal mining reclamation standards, which as 
noted previously118 reflect congressional concern that “States would find themselves 
forced into a bidding war to attract new industry by reducing pollution standards.”119 
Suppose that, contrary to congressional expectations, a particular state resisted the 
temptation to grovel for new coal mining industry and adopted reclamation standards 
more stringent than those promulgated by the Interior Department because the state 
regarded protection of the public health in this particular instance as more important than 
the attraction of new industry to the state.  The purposes that prompted Congress to enact 
SMCRA would not support preemption of the more stringent state standards because the 
state did not engage in the kind of conduct that Congress anticipated would necessitate 
federal regulation. 
 
It is conceivable that some states or localities might engage in a “race to the top,” 
competing to be the most environmentally friendly so as to attract some preferred group 
                                                 
114
 Note, however, that to overcome the presumption against preemption, these concerns should be both 
clearly expressed and central to the purposes of the statute.   
115
 See cases cited at supra note ___. 
116
 It might be argued that lack of information by states could lead to over-regulation in response to 
unfounded public fears.  See Elizabeth A. Weeks, Gauging the Cost of Loopholes:  Health Care Pricing 
and Medicare Regulation in the Post-Enron Era, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215 (2005) (discussing how 
information errors led to an excessive regulatory response in the context of Medicare); see generally Cass 
R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2003) (discussing information errors and their 
implications for regulation).  This sort of purpose might justify preemption, but to this point such concerns 
are not reflected in the federal environmental laws.   
117
 See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
118
 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
119
 H.R. REP. NO. 25-294, at 51-52 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1230-31. 
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of citizens or businesses (e.g., wealthy taxpayers).120  In extreme cases where states or 
local governments have such incentives, the problem merges with NIMBY phenomenon 
and will be addressed in that connection below.121  To date, however, there is little 
evidence that there is a systematic prisoners dilemma scenario in which states are forced 
to over-regulate in order to compete successfully with other states.  More fundamentally, 
while concerns about a race to the bottom are reflected in the purposes of many federal 
environmental laws, the countervailing problem of over-regulation from a race to the top 
is not reflected in any significant degree. 
 
2. Ceiling Preemption Based on Uniformity and NIMBY 
 
Thus, externalities, resource pooling, and the race to the bottom do not generally 
support ceiling preemption because they do not involve situations in which the states 
have incentives to over-regulate.  On the other hand, if the purpose of federal regulation 
is to ensure uniformity of standards or combat a NIMBY problem, then federal purposes 
may well support ceiling preemption.   
 
This point is most apparent when a major purpose of federal environmental law is 
to ensure uniformity.  Both less and more protective state standards would by definition 
be nonuniform and therefore undermine the federal purpose.  Indeed, it is no coincidence 
that the need for uniformity is one of the most important factors in assessing field 
preemption.122  Suppose, for example, that the basis for federal promulgation of 
nationally uniform standards controlling the emissions from motor vehicles is the desire 
to avoid the “chaos” that would face manufacturers, distributors, and dealers if they had 
to comply with a multiplicity of divergent state standards.123  Preemption of a more 
stringent set of state-issued auto emission standards is consistent with congressional 
purposes because a failure to preempt would generate exactly the kind of “chaos” that 
Congress wanted to avoid. 
 
To some extent, there is an argument for uniformity even when federal regulation 
is based primarily on negative environmental externalities, economies of scale, or the 
race to the bottom rationale, insofar as making federal regulation exclusive would reduce 
the costs of regulatory compliance.  Under these circumstances, businesses subject to 
federal law only have one set of standards with which they must comply.  Given that 
some sort of balance between environmental protection and regulatory burdens is implicit 
                                                 
120
 Although the literature at times refers to a race to the top to describe state and local governments’ 
adoption of aggressive environmental measures, an increasingly common phenomenon, the focus has been 
on disputing the race to the bottom hypothesis, rather than as an argument for federal ceiling preemption.  
See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 162-77 (2001) (arguing that suburbs 
are engaged in a race to the top in the protection of the environment). Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and 
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 583-625 (2001) (citing 
examples of aggressive state environmental regulation to dispute empirical accuracy of race to the bottom 
argument).  
121
 See infra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
122
 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
123
 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
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in all federal environmental laws, opponents of more stringent state standards can almost 
always find some general language in the statute (such as a declaration of purpose) or in 
the legislative history to support an argument for preemption to avoid state regulation that 
disrupts the federally struck balance by imposing additional regulatory burdens.124  The 
question, however, is whether this concern justifies interpretation of the federal law so as 
to displace state authority to adopt more protective standards.  In light of the presumption 
against preemption, something more than secondary purposes or general concerns for 
regulatory burdens should be necessary to warrant ceiling preemption.125  
 
Similarly, ceiling preemption makes sense when federal environmental regulation 
responds to a NIMBY problem because stringent state regulation may have the purpose 
and effect of forcing environmentally damaging activities to locate somewhere else.  The 
LLRWPA of 1980 illustrates this point.  Congress adopted the LLRWPA because it 
concluded that the desire of 47 states to avoid becoming the repository of low-level 
radioactive waste was unfairly burdening the three states with operational facilities with 
the risks and costs created by the disposal of all low-level wastes generated across the 
country.126  Given that purpose, it makes no sense to allow a state to adopt a siting regime 
that differs from the federal system and that effectively precludes any disposal facility 
from satisfying the state’s conditions for issuance of a permit to locate and operate the 
facility within the state.127  Accordingly, preemption of the state’s siting law would be 
consistent with the underlying justification for the federal regulatory program.128 
 
It is less clear whether such a federal law would also warrant floor preemption.  
Arguably, if federal regulation responds to a NIMBY problem, the concern is over-
regulation.  If, contrary to the expectations of Congress, a state were to lower its 
environmental standards to attract a radioactive waste disposal site, the concerns that 
                                                 
124
 One court described the process of adopting statutes that seek to accommodate potentially conflicting 
policy objectives as follows: 
It would be illegitimate for the judiciary, in pursuit of some overriding Congressional goal (such 
as eliminating water pollution), to tear asunder a specific provision which Congress saw fit to 
enact.  It scarcely needs repeating that statutes are rarely, if ever, unidimensionally directed 
towards achieving or vindicating a single public policy.  While a broad policy goal may well be 
the animating force driving the legislation, achievement of actual passage of the measure 
invariably requires compromise and accommodation. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
125
 See infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing this issue in connection with global climate 
change). 
126
 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
127
 In practice, NIMBY problems most frequently manifest themselves in overly strict regulations for siting 
environmentally hazardous facilities.  See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Benjamin Davy’s Essential Injustice: A 
Comparative and Philosophical Analysis of the LULU Siting Mess, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 607 (1998); 
Peter Margulies, Building Communities of Virtue: Political Theory and Land Use Policy, And The Not in 
My Backyard Syndrome, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV . 945 (1993).  See also Vicki Been, Analyzing Evidence of 
Environmental Justice, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.1 (1995) (empirical study of the extent to which locally 
undesirable land uses (LULUs) are disproportionately placed in communities that are predominantly 
populated by people of color and the poor). 
128
 Although the problem is most obvious sand common in the context of siting regulation, the same effect 
could be accomplished through the adoption of especially restrictive environmental standards for facilities, 
such as extremely costly measures to prevent radiation leaks. 
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supported federal regulation under the LLRWPA would not be engaged.  At the same 
time, however, statutes like the LLRWPA also typically incorporate some minimum 
federal standards.  Absent a savings clause in the federal law, such standards are binding 
and compliance with lower state standards would not be a defense to a violation of 
federal law.129 
 
  3. Synthesizing a Framework 
 
Most federal environmental statutes reflect a variety of primary and secondary 
purposes with varying implications for preemption of state law under the foregoing 
analysis.  Nonetheless, recognition of the fundamental differences in the extent to which 
particular purposes support ceiling preemption suggests some basic principles to apply 
when analyzing preemption issues.  These principles bear on both the legislative decision 
whether to preempt state law and the judicial decision whether federal environmental 
legislation preempts state law.  The first principle is meant to guide congressional 
policymakers, while the rest are directed to courts ascertaining whether a federal statute 
has preemptive effect and, if so, how broad that effect is. 
 
First, Congress should, as a general matter, refrain from express ceiling 
preemption unless there are strong justifications, in collective action terms, for displacing 
state authority to adopt more protective environmental regulations.  Such justifications 
could include (1) resource pooling to the extent that exclusivity is needed to strengthen 
the bargaining position of the national government; (2) a particular need for uniform 
national standards to reduce transactions costs and other regulatory burdens; or (3) a need 
for federal regulation to combat a NIMBY problem.  Further, Congress should make 
explicit reference to that justification either in any preemption provision included within 
the statute or in the initial recitation of statutory objectives. 
 
Second, express statutory language concerning preemption is of course 
controlling, and we do not mean to suggest that the courts should disregard the text of 
statutes that expressly preempt (or save) state law.  Statutory language, however, does not 
always clearly reveal the intended scope of federal preemption.130  In resolving 
ambiguities concerning the scope of an express preemption provision, courts should pay 
close attention to the extent to which ceiling preemption is, in a doubtful case, necessary 
to overcome collective action problems that would support it, such as the need for 
uniform standards or combating a NIMBY problem. 
                                                 
129
 The additional enforcement of state standards, even if they are not higher than the federal standards, 
would increase regulatory burdens and therefore might be incompatible with federal legislation that 
responds to a NIMBY problem.  See supra notes ___ and accompanying text (discussing the impact of 
lower state standards in the context of negative environmental externalities).   
130
 See, e.g., In re WTC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d 352, 375 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that “[f]athoming the 
extent of the intended preemption, however, requires a focus beyond the precise language of [the statute], 
for the respective reaches of terms such as ‘arising out of,’ ‘resulting from,’ and ‘relating to’ are not self-
evident); Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Global Naps, Inc., 377 F.3d 355, 371-72 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding that, 
despite statutory provisions that “partially flooded the existing statutory terrain with specific preempting 
federal requirements, carefully leaving numerous islands of State responsibility,” the “areas of 
responsibility are a patchwork, and the dividing lines are somewhat murky”). 
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Third, there are powerful arguments against implied preemption that justify a 
strong judicial presumption against ceiling preemption under federal environmental 
statutes in the absence of an express provision.131  The strong presumption against ceiling 
preemption might in principle be overcome by a clearly articulated statutory purpose that 
requires the conclusion that Congress intended to displace state regulatory authority, 
notwithstanding the presumption.  In general terms, statutory purposes that reflect a 
desire to combat negative externalities, take advantage of superior federal resources, or 
preclude a race to the bottom would not support implied ceiling preemption of state 
environmental regulation because more protective state regulation is not inconsistent with 
those purposes.132  The need for uniformity or a NIMBY rationale may support ceiling 
preemption, but courts should be reluctant to infer ceiling preemption unless these 
purposes are primary statutory purposes or central to the success of the federal regime. 
 
Fourth, courts should be very reluctant to infer preemption based upon secondary 
statutory purposes unless it is clear that Congress gave those purposes considerable 
weight. Specifically, general references to minimizing regulatory burdens, protecting 
businesses, or balancing environmental protection and economic growth should not, 
standing alone, justify the conclusion that federal law precludes states from adopting a 
different balance that is more protective of the environment than the federal standard.  
Likewise, the potential conflict with a desire to achieve uniformity or avoid NIMBYism 
should not support preemption unless Congress clearly articulated one of these ends as a 
major purpose of a federal environmental statute and the adverse impact of the state 
standard on the attainment of that purpose is clear.  
 
This framework requires careful attention to the reasons for federal entry into a 
field of environmental regulation and to the manner in which state or local regulation will 
affect those statutory purposes.  In the following section we apply the framework to one 
multi-faceted environmental issue: global climate change.  The analysis demonstrates the 
ways in which our framework facilitates the analysis of preemption issues so as to 
accommodate competing federal and state interests. 
 
II. Ceiling Preemption:  A Global Climate Change Example 
 
 In this part of the article we illustrate the utility of our analytical framework in the 
context of regulating various activities believed to contribute to global climate change.133  
Section A provides general background for the analysis of preemption issues relating to 
climate change, including a brief overview of the federal government’s current approach 
to regulation and of the regulatory initiatives the states have taken.  Section B assesses 
how each of the five justifications for federal environmental regulation described in Part I 
                                                 
131
 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
132
 Nonetheless, in some cases ceiling preemption might be appropriate if federal law pursues those 
purposes using a means that would be frustrated by state regulation, such as a pollution trading regime, or 
supplements those purposes with other purposes that state law would thwart. 
133
 Although we focus in this part primarily on climate change issues, we also discuss ceiling preemption 
under other environmental regulatory programs where they provide useful comparisons with the resolution 
of the issues of ceiling preemption raised by climate change regulation. 
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bears on ceiling preemption of state efforts to address climate change and suggests that it 
is more justified as to some aspects of global climate change regulation than others.  
Moreover, even when ceiling preemption is justified, our framework suggests some 
necessary accommodations within the substantive content of federal regulatory programs.  
  
A. Current Federal and State Regulation 
 
The federal and state response to global climate change reflects the trends 
discussed in the introduction to this article.  At the federal level, although there is a 
statutory basis for the regulation of GHG emissions that contribute to global climate 
change, regulatory agencies (particularly EPA) have resisted efforts to regulate on 
various legal and policy grounds.  Some states, meanwhile, have taken a more aggressive 
regulatory posture.  Thus, global climate change and the regulation of GHGs represent 
precisely the kind of scenario in which one would expect ceiling preemption issues to 
arise. 
 
 1. Federal Regulation 
 
 The principal federal statute for controlling air pollution that may be harmful to 
the public health or the environment is the Clean Air Act (CAA).134  Although the CAA 
authorizes a wide variety of regulatory programs, the two that are most obviously 
relevant to the threats posed by global climate change are (1) programs specifically 
regulating motor vehicle emissions and (2) those establishing “ambient air quality 
standards” and authorizing states to adopt plans for meeting those standards.   
 
Section 202 of the CAA mandates that EPA prescribe “standards applicable to the 
emission of any air pollutant” from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines 
which, in the judgment of EPA, “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health 
or welfare.”135  The Act defines an “air pollutant,” in relevant part, as “any air pollution 
agent or combination of agents, including any physical, chemical, [or] biological 
substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”136  To 
date, EPA has not issued any motor vehicle emission standards for carbon dioxide (CO2) 
or the other principal greenhouse gases (GHGs).  In 1999, a coalition of states, cities, and 
environmental nongovernmental organizations filed a petition with EPA requesting that it 
regulate emissions of CO2 and other GHGs from new motor vehicles under § 202 of the 
CAA.  In 2003, EPA denied the petition on two grounds.   
 
First, EPA asserted that it lacked the statutory authority to adopt vehicle emission 
control standards for CO2 and the other GHGs under § 202 because none of those 
substances qualifies as an “air pollutant” under the Act.137  EPA also supported the 
position that it lacks legal authority to regulate CO2 emissions from motor vehicles on the 
                                                 
134
 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q. 
135
 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). 
136
 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g). 
137
 Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines; Notice of denial of petition for 
rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
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ground that emission standards would effectively regulate the fuel economy of passenger 
cars and light duty trucks.  According to EPA, “[n]o technology currently exists or is 
under development that can capture and destroy or reduce emissions of CO2.  At present, 
the only practical way to reduce tailpipe emissions of CO2 is to improve fuel 
economy.”138 Congress authorized the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT) to issue and implement 
mandatory corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards139 for cars and light duty 
trucks when it adopted the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) in 1975.140  EPA 
argued that “[t]he only way for EPA to proceed with CO2 emissions standards without 
upsetting this statutory scheme would be to set a standard less stringent than [NHTSA’s 
CAFE standards] for cars and light duty trucks. But such an approach would be 
meaningless in terms of reducing GHG emissions from the U.S. motor vehicle fleet.”141 
 
Second, EPA asserted that even if it had authority to regulate GHGs, EPA would 
exercise its regulatory discretion and refuse to adopt emission control standards on 
several policy grounds.  First, regulation under § 202 of GHG emissions from new motor 
vehicles, which are one of many sources of those GHGs, would “result in an inefficient, 
piecemeal approach to the climate change issue.”142  Second, unilateral regulation by the 
United States of motor vehicle emissions might weaken efforts to persuade developing 
countries to reduce their own GHG emissions.  Third, ongoing research into scientific 
uncertainties about the causes and effects of global climate change and into possible 
technological solutions made regulation premature.  Fourth, with respect to the 
petitioners’ second suggested remedial mechanism (improved tire efficiency), EPA raised 
doubts that it has the authority under the CAA to regulate tire efficiency as an “emission” 
of an air pollutant.143 
 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, however, the Supreme Court rejected EPA’s arguments 
and left little doubt that EPA would have to regulate GHG emissions.144  The Court gave 
short shrift to EPA’s claim that GHGs are not air pollutants, finding that they fit 
comfortably within the “capacious” statutory definition of that term.145  It also firmly 
rejected EPA’s alternative basis for denying the petition – that even if it does have 
                                                 
138
 Id. at 52,929. 
139
 The CAFE standards reflect “the sales weighted average fuel economy, expressed in miles per gallon 
(mpg), of a manufacturer’s fleet of passenger cars or light trucks with a gross vehicle weight rating 
(GVWR) of 8,500 lbs. or less, manufactured for sale in the United States, for any given model year.”  
NHTSA, CAFE Overview — Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/cafe/overview.htm.  
140
 Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 301, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 32906-32919).   
141
 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,929.  EPA pointed out that DOT had recently issued more stringent fuel economy 
standards, which would reduce CO2 emission by approximately 31 million tons.  Id. at 52,931. 
142
 Id. at 52,931. 
143
 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,929-31.  The petitioners failed to suggest any actions that EPA could take to reduce 
emissions of other GHGs, including CH4 and N2O from motor vehicles.  Id. at 52,931. 
144
 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (reversing Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 
2005)). 
145
 Id. at 1462.  The CAA defines an “air pollutant” as “any air pollution agent or combination of such 
agents, including any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters 
the ambient air. . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (emphasis added). 
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statutory authority to regulate GHGs, it would be unwise to do so at this time – because 
EPA “has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse 
gases cause or contribute to climate change.”146  The Court further indicated that, on 
remand, “EPA can avoid taking further action [to regulate GHG emissions from motor 
vehicles] only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change 
or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its 
discretion to determine whether they do.”147  Some observers have interpreted the 
decision as all but forcing EPA to regulate GHG emissions not only from mobile, but also 
stationary sources.148 
 
EPA also regulates pollution pursuant to sections 108-110 of the CAA, which 
directs EPA to compile a list of “each air pollutant” (called a “criteria pollutant”) whose 
emissions cause or contribute, in EPA’s judgment, to “air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” and whose presence “in 
the ambient air results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources.”149  Once 
EPA lists an air pollutant as a criteria pollutant, the CAA requires that EPA issue national 
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) that specify maximum permissible 
concentrations of the relevant pollutant in the ambient air, measured over different 
periods of time.150  The CAA requires the states to develop plans (called state 
implementation plans, or SIPs) to achieve the NAAQS within a period prescribed by the 
Act.151 
 
EPA has not issued NAAQS for CO2 or other GHGs.  As a result, the statutory 
requirement that states craft and implement plans for reducing emissions of the criteria 
pollutants from stationary as well as mobile sources has not been triggered for these 
pollutants.  The Supreme Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. EPA that the CAA vests in 
EPA the authority to regulate CO2 as an air pollutant under the motor vehicle emission 
                                                 
146
 Id. at 1463.  More specifically, that aspect of EPA’s decision rested on “reasoning divorced from the 
statutory text,” Id. at 1462, and EPA’s “laundry list of reasons not to regulate” were not persuasive because 
“it is evident they have nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change.”   
Id. at 1463. 
147
 Id. at 1462. 
148
 See, e.g., Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Mobile Sources − 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 37 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10535, 10538 (2007) (asserting that “the Court’s 
opinion pushes EPA to find that GHGs need to be regulated”); Jonathan H. Adler, Massachusetts v. EPA 
Heats Up Climate Policy No Less Than Administrative Law: A Comment on Professors Watts and 
Wildermuth, Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper 07-20 (June 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=993511.  
149
 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)-(B).  States must achieve these standards by developing implementation 
plans, which must include source-specific emissions limitations, that may apply to all sources of pollution, 
both stationary and mobile. 
150
 See 42 U.S.C. § 7409; 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-50.12.  EPA must issue “primary” ambient air quality 
standards that are “requisite to protect the public health, allowing an adequate margin of safety.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7409(a)(1), (b)(1).  EPA also must develop “secondary” ambient air quality standards that are “requisite 
to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of 
such air pollutant in the ambient air.” 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1), (b)(2).  The statute defines the term 
“welfare” to include, but not be limited to, “effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, 
animals, wildlife, [and] weather.” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h). 
151
 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410, 7502(a). 
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standard provisions of the Act (and sharply constrains its discretion to refuse to do so) 
seems equally applicable to GHG emissions from stationary sources.152  One or more of 
EPA’s policy-based reasons for deferring regulation of GHGs under the CAA at this time 
might also be relevant to EPA’s failure to regulate these substances as criteria pollutants 
(assuming EPA has any discretion to choose which pollutants qualify as criteria 
pollutants).153  These might include the desire to avoid unilateral U.S. reductions and the 
uncertainty about causes and technical solutions. 
 
  2. State Regulation 
 
 In the absence of regulation by EPA of CO2 emissions from motor vehicles or 
stationary sources under the CAA, many state governments have adopted their own 
regulatory programs.154  These state statutory regimes fall into at least three categories.  
First, California has adopted legislation and regulations requiring reductions in GHG 
emissions from motor vehicles, and several other states have followed suit by adopting 
California’s standards.155   
 
Second, in 2006, California adopted the Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006.156  The Act requires the State Air Resources Board to adopt a statewide GHG 
emissions limit, to be achieved by 2020, that is equivalent to the statewide level in 1990.  
The Board also must adopt regulations to achieve the maximum technologically feasible 
and cost-effective emission reductions of particular GHGs (which include CO2, methane, 
nitrous oxide, and HCFCs) from various categories of sources.157   
 
Third, some states, either alone or in conjunction with other states, have adopted 
regulatory programs to reduce CO2 emissions from particular kinds of stationary sources.  
The most prominent of these programs is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
in which several northeastern and mid-Atlantic states are participating.  The program 
mandates reductions in CO2 emissions from power plants, but it includes a cap-and-trade 
program that permits regulated utilities to comply with their reduction obligations by 
purchasing emissions credits from other regulated entities that exceed their mandated 
                                                 
152
 The triggers for EPA’s authority to regulate air pollution from stationary sources differ somewhat from 
the trigger for regulation of mobile source pollution, however.  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (mandate 
to regulate mobile source pollution) with id. § 7408(a)(1) (factors for listing criteria pollutants) and id. § 
7411(b)(1)(A) (authority to regulate new stationary sources). 
153
 Although EPA has discretion to determine whether an air pollutant satisfies the tests for designation of 
an air pollutant as a criteria pollutant, it does not have the authority to fail to issue NAAQS for an air 
pollutant that does meet those criteria.  See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
154
 See Glicksman, supra note __, at 781-84. 
155
 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 43018.5(a).  See also Glicksman, supra note __, at 782. 
156
 Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38501-38599.  
157
 Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38560, 38562, 38570. 
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emissions cuts.158  Regulated entities have attacked the validity of state efforts on the 
ground that they are preempted by federal law.159 
 
B. Preemption and the Environmental Purposes of the CAA 
 
Of the collective action purposes supporting federal environmental regulation, the 
CAA is based primarily on purposes that do not generally support ceiling preemption of 
state GHG regulation, such as negative externalities, resource pooling, and the race to the 
bottom, although there are some arguments for ceiling preemption to strengthen the 
bargaining position of the United States vis-à-vis other countries.  The need for 
uniformity, which would tend to support ceiling preemption, is most prominent with 
respect to regulation of motor vehicle emissions (as to which there are express 
provisions), but is insufficiently prominent to support ceiling preemption for regulation of 
stationary sources.  The NIMBY rationale, which might also support ceiling preemption, 
is not implicated in the current regulatory regimes.  
 
1. Negative Externalities 
 
 One of the primary justifications for federal intervention in the field of air 
pollution control, and the adoption of certain provisions of the CAA,160 was to combat the 
negative externalities of interstate air pollution.161  Under our framework, that 
justification provides weak support for ceiling preemption of state laws designed to 
reduce emissions of air pollutants such as CO2 that contribute to global climate change. 
 
There are certainly negative transboundary environmental externalities that 
support federal regulation of GHG emissions,162 even if their precise impact is difficult to 
predict.163  But federal intervention to combat negative environmental externalities 
responds to collective action problems that will lead a state to under-regulate because it 
                                                 
158
 See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, An Initiative of the Northeast & Mid-Atlantic States of the 
U.S., available at http://www.rggi.org.  Some Midwestern states have also participated in regional efforts 
to reduce CO2 emissions.  See Glicksman, supra note __, at 782. 
159
 See, e.g., Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
160
 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7426. 
161
 See supra  notes ___ and accompanying text. 
162
 “By its very nature, climate change is a common global concern of all countries, for climate respects no 
political boundaries.” EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
591 (2d ed. 2007).  It is fairly clear that the United States as a whole is externalizing some of the costs of 
global climate change. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
663 (2d ed. 2007) (suggesting that the United States, as the country with the greatest GHG output in the 
world, will contribute to the climate change problem worldwide).  Scientific evidence seems to support the 
conclusion, for example, that portions of the developing world will experience the most dramatic adverse 
effects of climate change, even though GHG emissions there are relatively low. STERN REVIEW: THE 
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE vii (2006), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm 
(finding that although all countries will suffer the adverse effects of global climate change, the poorest 
countries will suffer earliest and most, despite the fact that they have contributed least to the problem). 
163
 It is possible that some areas will derive some benefits from global climate change.   Nonetheless, states 
are unlikely to pursue a policy of deliberately refusing to control CO2 emissions because they believe they 
will benefit from doing so or that only other jurisdictions will be adversely affected.   
Draft of article forthcoming in Vol. 102, Nw. U. L. Rev. 
Please do not quote without authors’ permission 
Environmental Preemption Glicksman&Levy Draft.doc Page 35 8/14/2007 
does not bear the full environmental costs of pollution caused within the state.  If a state 
such as California adopts a program to control CO2 emissions from motor vehicles or 
from stationary sources, that program does not implicate the concern for under-regulation 
because of interjurisdictional externalities.164   
 
Under the negative interstate externality rationale, there is no reason to preempt 
emission controls on CO2 that go beyond what the federal government has mandated if a 
state has managed to confound pessimistic federal expectations by controlling pollution 
that is likely to have as much adverse effect outside the jurisdiction as within.  In a sense, 
a state that regulates GHG emissions to an extent not required by federal law is providing 
a public good rather than seeking to exploit the commons by filling it with a public bad.  
Unless state regulation of GHGs interferes with another primary purpose of the CAA or 
the implementation of a particular regulatory program,165 ceiling preemption has no 
legitimate role to play under those circumstances.166 
 
2. Superior Resources/Pooling 
 
 The superiority of federal resources was a basis for precursors to the CAA and the 
advantages of resource pooling continue to be a consideration in favor of regulation at the 
federal level.167  Even if this consideration is regarded as a primary justification for 
federal regulation of GHGs, under our framework that rationale generally provides little 
support for ceiling preemption, with the possible exception of circumstances under which 
independent state action might compromise a collective response to a third party, as in 
international negotiations by the United States.   
 
Superior resources (as a result of pooling) might enable the federal government to 
generate scientific information on global climate change and to implement or enforce 
regulation of GHGs more effectively than states, but these advantages do not support 
ceiling preemption.  Certainly, there has been an enormous federal investment in 
scientific research into climate change and its relation to GHGs.168  This information, 
                                                 
164
 With respect to mobile emission sources, however, a state may be able to externalize regulatory burdens 
because the costs of stricter standards for GHGs emissions (which inherently require greater fuel 
efficiency) may fall primarily on other states, such as those that produce vehicles, and may also fall on 
consumers in other states whose vehicles will be more costly.  See supra notes ___ and accompanying text 
(discussing similar reasoning by Congress).  We address these issues below in connection with the 
uniformity rationale for federal regulation.  See infra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
165
 See infra notes ___ and accompanying text (discussing secondary purposes); notes ___ and 
accompanying text (discussing implications of state regulation for cap-and-trade programs). 
166
 In addition, the federal government may not provide effective regulation of interstate externalities.  See, 
e.g., GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note __, at 525-27 (describing inadequacy of EPA’s implementation of 
interstate air pollution provisions under the 1970 Clean Air Act); Air Pollution:  N.J. Files Suit Against 
EPA over Pa. Power Plant Emissions, GREENWIRE, Feb. 7, 2007, available at 
http://www.eenews/net/Greenwire/print/2007/02/07/16 (describing New Jersey’s allegation that EPA had 
failed to stop Pennsylvania coal-fired power plant near the New Jersey border from emitting more than 10 
times the allowable amount). 
167
 See, e.g., GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note __, at 86 (discussing economies of scale and research 
leadership provided by federal information gathering). 
168
 E.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 6701, 6711; 15 U.S.C. §§ 2904 2921; 42 U.S.C. §§ 13383, 13385, 13389. 
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however, is in the public domain and generally available to policy makers in the states.  
Lack of state resources does not provide any inherent reason to suggest that state policy 
makers would be prone to over-regulate on the basis of that information.169  Similarly, if 
a particular state decides to expend its relatively limited resources for regulatory 
implementation and enforcement, the superiority of federal resources does not provide a 
rationale for precluding such efforts. 
 
 The more difficult issue relates to the premise that pooling of resources increases 
leverage and bargaining power vis-à-vis other parties.170 When EPA denied the states’ 
petition to regulate CO2 emissions from motor vehicles in 2003, one of the explanations it 
provided was its conviction that unilateral regulation by the United States of motor 
vehicle emissions might weaken efforts to persuade developing countries to reduce their 
own GHG emissions.171  The auto industry has extended this reasoning in a pending 
action seeking a declaration that California’s restrictions on GHG emissions from motor 
vehicles are preempted, arguing that “the implementation of the California regulations 
‘interferes with the ability of the United States to speak with one voice upon matters of 
global climate change’ and ‘diminishes the bargaining power of the United States in 
negotiating multilateral reductions in greenhouse gases.’”172  A federal district court 
found the argument sufficiently plausible that it denied the state’s motion for judgment 
on the pleadings.173 
 
These arguments could draw some support from two recent Supreme Court 
decisions involving preemption in the foreign policy context, although those cases are 
distinguishable in important respects.  First, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade 
Council,174 the Court held that a Massachusetts law designed to put pressure on Burma 
(Myanmar) to improve its human rights practices was an obstacle to the accomplishment 
of the purposes of a federal statute authorizing the President to impose economic 
sanctions against Burma.  The Court reasoned that the state law interfered with the 
statute’s “delegation of effective discretion to the President to control economic sanctions 
against Burma, its limitation of sanctions solely to United States persons and new 
investment, and its directive to the President to proceed diplomatically in developing a 
                                                 
169
 One possible argument would be that state policy makers, if less fully informed because the state lacks 
the resources to pay for the most highly qualified experts, may be more likely to process the information 
incorrectly.  See supra notes ___.  Such reasoning, however, is not reflected in the purposes of the CAA 
and would provide a relatively weak justification for a congressional decision to preempt state law.  Indeed, 
relatively uninformed policy makers may be just as prone to under-regulate − due to lack of appreciation of 
the risks posed by climate change − as to over-regulate.  Cf. Manya A. Brachear, Religious Leaders Divided 
About Global  Warming, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 15, 2007 (reporting Oklahoma Senator Inhofe’s comment that 
global warming is “the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people”). 
170
 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
171
 See supra note ___ and accompanying text. 
172
 Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1177 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting ¶ 
130 of the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint). 
173
 The court anchored its analysis in the proposition, recognized by the Supreme Court, that “it was out of 
‘concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations’ that the Constitution allocated the 
foreign relations power to the federal government.”  Id. at 1175 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamedi, 539 
U.S. 396, 413 (2003)). 
174
 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
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comprehensive, multilateral strategy toward Burma.”175  Second in American Insurance 
Ass'n v. Garamendi,176 the Court held that a California law designed to force foreign 
insurers to disclose records concerning insurance for Holocaust victims was impliedly 
preempted by presidential executive agreements with several countries in which insurers 
were located.  Both of these cases suggest that preemption of state law may be justified in 
order to afford the President a strong hand in negotiations on foreign policy issues. 
 
Nonetheless, the cases differ from the situation concerning global climate change 
in critical respects that weaken the case for preemption of state GHG restrictions.  First 
and foremost, in both cases the state laws in question directly addressed foreign relations 
matters in purpose and effect – in Crosby policy toward Burma and in Garamendi the 
legal obligations of insurance companies located in Europe.  By way of contrast, state 
regulation of GHG emissions is directed at domestic activities within the state within a 
traditional area of state authority. 
  
Second, the legal basis for implied preemption was much stronger in both cases.  
In Crosby, intent to provide the President with a free hand in international negotiations 
was the central purpose of a federal statute and clear on its face, which is not the case for 
the CAA.177  Another statute, the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987,178 provides for 
the development of a federal global climate change policy and makes the State 
Department “responsible to coordinate those aspects of United States policy requiring 
action through the channels of multilateral diplomacy.”179  While this provision might be 
analogized to the federal statute in Crosby, the Global Climate Protection Act contains 
little evidence of congressional intent to prevent states from regulating environmentally 
harmful activities within their jurisdiction so as to bolster the State Department’s 
negotiating position.180  In Massachusetts v. EPA, moreover, the Supreme Court made 
clear that this statute does not affect the regulatory regime of the CAA by rejecting 
EPA’s reliance on this argument as a basis for declining to regulate GHGs.181 
                                                 
175
 Id. at 373-74. 
176
 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
177
 There is nothing in the text or legislative history of the CAA that reflects a primary purpose to protect 
the President’s ability to negotiate international treaties.  To the contrary the entire thrust of the CAA is 
inconsistent with the notion that voluntary regulation of air pollution by states or by the federal government 
would somehow undermine our ability to negotiate international environmental agreements effectively.  
One narrow provision of the CAA addresses the international effects of air pollution but, as will be 
discussed below, this provision is narrow and does not support broad preemption of state regulation.  See 
infra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
178
 Pub.L. 100-204, Title XI, §§ 1101 to 1106, Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1407, as amended by Pub.L. 103-
199, Title VI, § 603(1), Dec. 17, 1993, 107 Stat. 2327 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2901 note). 
179
 Id. § 1103(c). 
180
 The reluctance of courts to allow international political considerations to affect the scope or content of 
domestic regulatory programs in the absence of explicit congressional instruction is also reflected in Earth 
Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 2007 WL 2027398 (9th Cir. 2007).  The court in that case invalidated a finding by 
the Secretary of Commerce that the use of purse seine nets to catch tuna was not having a significant 
adverse impact on depleted dolphin stocks in the Pacific Ocean.  It concluded that the Secretary improperly 
relied on international political concerns that were “within Congress’s bailiwick,” instead of basing the 
finding exclusively on scientific factors, as Congress intended.  Id. at *9.  See also Browner v. Evans, 257 
F.3d 1058, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2001). 
181
 The Court reasoned that: 
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In Garamendi, there was no statutory basis for preemption, but the Court 
recognized that the President has power to negotiate executive agreements without 
congressional consent and that these agreements may preempt state laws.182  Critically, 
however, valid executive agreements had been negotiated in Garamendi and it was these 
agreements that provided the legal basis for preemption.  In contrast, there is no executive 
agreement currently in place to preempt state GHG emissions.183  Thus, preemption in 
this case would extend even further and recognize preemption of state environmental 
regulation on the basis of the President’s unexercised foreign relations authority.   
 
Such an argument might be supportable if the states were directly interfering with 
foreign relations by specifically targeting entities in other countries in order to achieve 
foreign relations objectives.184  But ceiling preemption in this context would displace the 
states’ authority to regulate domestic activities within the state because of their incidental 
impact on international matters.  In an era of increasing globalization, this argument 
would preempt a vast realm of state regulation that might implicate the interests of other 
countries and therefore could plausibly be subject to presidential negotiations. 
 
We also doubt that unilateral state regulation would so undermine the 
international bargaining position of the United States as to warrant a congressional 
decision to adopt express ceiling preemption.  The United States is responsible for an 
estimated 20 to 25 percent of the world’s GHG emissions.185  The “defection” of a state 
(even a large one such as California)186 or group of states from the united, anti-regulatory 
front presented by the federal government is unlikely to put a significant dent in the clout 
that negotiators have in dealing with the environmental policymakers of foreign nations.  
Many other factors are likely to have a far more substantial impact on negotiations.187 
                                                                                                                                                 
while the President has broad authority in foreign affairs, that authority does not extend 
to the refusal to execute domestic laws.  In the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, 
Congress authorized the State Department − not EPA − to formulate United States 
foreign policy with reference to environmental matters relating to climate.  See § 1103(c), 
101 Stat. 1409.  EPA has made no showing that it issued the ruling in question here after 
consultation with the State Department.  Congress did direct EPA to consult with other 
agencies in the formulation of its policies and rules, but the State Department is absent 
from that list. 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007). 
182
 539 U.S. at 415-17. 
183
 Indeed, as observed by the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA is not even the proper body to assert 
foreign policy concerns. 127 S. Ct. at 1463 (quoted supra note ___).   Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 
U.S. 88 (1976) (invalidating Federal Civil Service Commission regulation barring aliens from the civil 
service because the agency justification of promoting reciprocal benefits for United States citizens in other 
countries was not within the responsibilities of the Commission). 
184
 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (invalidating Oregon law imposing conditions on the right 
of foreign nationals to succeed to property as an interference with the exclusive federal foreign relations 
authority because the law was an effort to punish communist regimes).  
185
 HUNTER ET AL., supra note ___, at 663; BROWN WEISS, supra note ___, at 649. 
186
 California contributes 6.7 percent of total U.S. CO2 emissions.  Margaret Kriz, Bench Press for Cleaner 
Fuels, NAT’L J., Feb. 24, 2007, at 39, 40. 
187
 The increase in media attention to global climate change issues in the United States, the shift in U.S. 
public opinion toward stronger support for federal regulation of GHG emissions (see Robert L. Glicksman, 
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3. Race to the Bottom 
 
A third rationale that underlies certain components of the CAA is concern over a 
race to the bottom.188  Under our framework, this rationale, like negative externalities and 
resource pooling, does not provide much support for ceiling preemption of state 
regulation of GHG emissions.  A federal regulatory presence based on the race to the 
bottom assumes a prisoners’ dilemma scenario that forces states to under-regulate GHGs 
in order to compete for businesses who make location decisions based in part on the 
regulatory environment.  If, contrary to these expectations, a state is willing to run those 
economic risks in order to supply its citizens with a level of environmental protection that 
extends beyond what the federal government is supplying, the race to the bottom has not 
materialized. Such action is not contrary to the purposes of the federal legislation. 
 
A different issue is presented by the Bush Administration’s reliance on an 
international race to the bottom in refusing thus far to support the adoption of mandatory 
controls on GHG emissions.  The Secretary of Energy, for example, has expressed a 
concern that “the imposition of a carbon cap in this country would . . . lead to the transfer 
of jobs and industries abroad that do not have such carbon caps [and that] you’d have the 
U.S. economy damaged on the one end and the same emissions, potentially worse 
emissions, because they don’t have the same type of standards.”189  The question is 
whether this rationale supports ceiling preemption. 
 
Standing alone, the existence of an international race to the bottom would not tend 
to support ceiling preemption because it would not lead to over-regulation by states.  
Indeed, the same incentives that create an international race to the bottom would tend to 
cause states to under-regulate as well.  Thus, if a state decides to adopt more stringent 
GHG regulation than the federal government, 190 that judgment is not the result of a race-
to-the-bottom problem.  Moreover, because the economic costs will be borne at least in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Global Climate Change and the Risks to Coastal Areas From Hurricanes and Rising Sea Levels: The Costs 
of Doing Nothing, 52 LOYOLA L. REV. 1127, 1184-97 (2006)), the flurry of legislation introduced in 
Congress with bipartisan support to abate climate change (see, e.g., Global Warming Reduction Act of 
2007, S. 485, 110th Cong.), the impending change in presidential administrations in 2009, and the support 
for federal regulation provided by many important businesses in the United States (see Margaret Kriz, 
Flash: Industry Now Seeks GHG Limits, 24 ENVTL. F. 8 (March/April 2007)) are all likely to send stronger 
signals to foreign negotiators about the ability of the President to strike a deal on his own terms than would 
the decisions by the states to initiate mandatory controls on GHGs even in the absence of federal controls. 
188
 See, Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the 
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 581 (2007); Christopher A. Brook, Comment, Cuba: 
Undermining or Underlining the “Race to the Bottom?”, 30 N.C. J. INT’L & COMP. REG. 197, 199-200 
(2004); supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
189
 Darren Samuelson, Climate: Bush Officials Insist No Change Is Coming on GHG Caps, GREENWIRE, 
Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2007/02/02/2.  The Secretary also warned that 
“[t]he U.S. economy is not something to be experimented with in my judgment.”  Id. 
190
 Thus, the Secretary of Energy also acknowledged that some states, such as California, have reached a 
different judgment as to the proper balance between economic competitiveness and environmental 
protection than the administration has.  He responded that “[i]f I am right” about the adverse economic 
implications of choosing to regulate, “California will lose jobs and we’re going to follow that.”  Id. 
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part by businesses and consumers in the state, there is no systematic externalization of 
economic burdens that might be expected to produce over-regulation.191 
 
The thrust of the international race to the bottom argument, however, is focused 
on international relations and is thus a variant of the collective bargaining argument 
discussed above in connection with resource pooling.192  The idea would be that 
unilateral regulation by states would prevent the federal government from insisting on 
reciprocity from other countries before the United States restricts its GHG output.  There 
is, however, little evidence that the CAA was intended to withhold federal and state 
regulation of pollutants in order to strengthen the negotiation position of the United 
States with respect to other countries on air pollution matters.  One specific provision, 
section 115 of the Act, provides that if EPA finds that emissions from a state cause or 
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger health or 
welfare in another country, EPA may require that state to revise its implementation plan 
to abate the emissions, provided the affected foreign country has provided essentially the 
same protection for the United States from the adverse effects of air pollution that 
originates in the foreign country.193  This provision arguably reflects a congressional 
purpose to pursue a strategy of reciprocity in response to the prisoners’ dilemma that 
underlies the race-to-the-bottom problem. 
 
This provision, however, applies to a very narrow circumstance that does not 
implicate a unilateral decision by states to regulate GHGs.  The reciprocity requirement 
applies only (1) when considerations of harm to another country, standing alone, would 
be used (2) to require a state to regulate more stringently pollution activity within the 
state.194  A critical point is that this provision does not prohibit or reflect concern for a 
state’s voluntary restriction of GHG emissions based upon its own determination that the 
environmental benefits outweigh the economic costs, but rather is a limitation on EPA’s 
ability to force states to reduce emissions based on effects in another country.  Indeed, 
outside this narrow context, the CAA reflects a rejection of the international race-to-the-
bottom phenomenon, insofar as it contemplates unilateral reduction of pollutants within 
the United States without regard to similarly strict regulation in other countries.   
 
Furthermore, even if strengthening the ability of the United States to negotiate 
reciprocal concessions from other countries so as to combat the international race to the 
bottom provides a theoretical argument for ceiling preemption, in practice it provides 
little support for such an outcome.  As noted previously, the tendency of state restrictions 
on GHG emissions to weaken the United States’ bargaining position with respect to other 
countries is marginal, and likely overwhelmed by a host of other factors.195  Moreover, 
virtually every industrialized nation in the world has already committed to the reduction 
                                                 
191
 It is true that some economic burdens from stringent regulation of GHGs would be felt in other states, 
but (with the possible exception of mobile sources of pollution, see infra notes ___ and accompanying text) 
the regulating state would feel at least its proportional share of the burden.  Conversely, some of the 
environmental benefits would be externalized as well.   
192
 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
193




 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
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regime established by the Kyoto Protocol.196  Accordingly, were the United States to 
impose mandatory controls on GHG emission, it would hardly stand on its own in doing 
so and state restrictions would not seriously undermine our negotiating position. 
 
In sum, the international race to the bottom provides only weak support for ceiling 
preemption, particularly implied preemption based upon the provisions of the CAA.  
Notwithstanding the theoretical possibility that such a justification for federal regulation 
could support ceiling preemption, in the context of GHG emissions the prospect of state 
regulation interfering with the federal government’s strategy to combat an international 
race to the bottom is insufficient to overcome the presumption against preemption. There 
is neither sufficient support in the statutory language and history to conclude that it was a 
primary purpose of the CAA or related statutes, nor evidence to suggest it is a serious 
concern in practice.  Under these circumstances, the argument proves too much, since it 
would apply equally to all kinds of pollutants and thus would support broad occupation of 
the field by the CAA, which is clearly contrary to its text and to purposes.197 
 
4. Uniform Standards 
 
The CAA reflects a legislative purpose to obtain the advantages of uniform 
federal regulation, particularly when dealing with regulation of motor vehicle emissions.  
Under our framework, the desire for uniformity as a justification for the federal 
regulation of GHGs would generally tend to support ceiling preemption (as well as floor 
preemption).  But the extent to which this purpose is sufficiently clear and central to the 
CAA varies depending upon the type of source and emissions being regulated.  The need 
for uniformity in regulating motor vehicle emissions is particularly strong, a 
determination Congress reached when it adopted express preemption provisions in the 
CAA on that subject.  As to stationary sources, however, the justification for ceiling 
preemption is far weaker. 
 
  a.  State Regulation of Motor Vehicle Emissions 
 
The transaction costs of nonuniform regulation are particularly high for goods 
produced in large numbers that move from state to state, like cars and trucks.  It is hardly 
surprising, then, that section 209 of the CAA expressly prohibits state or local 
governments from “adopt[ing] or enforc[ing] any standard relating to the control of 
emissions from new motor vehicles or motor vehicle engines subject to this part,”198 
although there is a separate waiver provision under which EPA may permit California to 
adopt more stringent standards that may then be adopted by other states as well.199  The 
                                                 
196
 As of December 13, 2006, 168 nations, not including the United States, had ratified the Protocol.  See 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php; 
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/background/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/kp_rat_131206.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2007). 
197
 See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (preserving state authority to regulate air pollution, provided state regulation is not 
less stringent than applicable federal regulation). 
198
 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).  
199
 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7543(b), 7507.  Under section 7543(b), any state that had vehicle emission standards in 
place before March 30, 1966, may adopt more restrictive standards if it applies for and receives a waiver 
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analysis of the ceiling preemption issue in this context is complicated, however, by two 
factors.  First, the federal government has declined thus far to regulate GHGs under the 
CAA.  Second, because of the direct linkage between control of GHG emissions and 
motor vehicle fuel economy, this issue implicates a second statutory scheme governing 
fuel economy standards. 
 
When the federal government has declined to regulate in a given area, ceiling 
preemption creates a regulatory void, leaving states with no power whatsoever to protect 
the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.  Given that ceiling preemption in this 
context prevents the states from protecting their citizens without replacing it with any 
alternative protections, the presumption against implied preemption should be especially 
strong.  If this decision is reflected in a statute that embodies a conscious legislative 
decision in favor of a laissez faire environment, that decision has been subjected to the 
political safeguards of federalism.200  But the mere failure to regulate should not preempt 
state regulatory initiatives.201  First, the failure of Congress to pass a regulatory statute 
does not necessarily reflect a decision to adopt a laissez faire regulatory regime, because 
legislation may fail for a variety of reasons. Second, congressional failure to adopt a 
statute, unlike enacted legislation, does not meet the requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment.202   
 
The situation for GHGs is more complex because Congress has authorized EPA to 
regulate GHGs, but EPA has to this point declined to do so.203  The CAA’s preemption 
provisions have been subjected to the political safeguards of federalism, but the CAA 
assumes that EPA will regulate harmful pollutants.204  Thus, it is by no means clear that 
                                                                                                                                                 
from the EPA.  In practice, the only state that had standards in place by the specified date is California.  
Under section 7507, other states may opt to follow California’s more stringent standards.  For discussion of 
California’s unique treatment under the motor vehicle emissions standards of the CAA and its predecessors, 
see generally Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 281 (2003).  This system preserves uniformity to a large degree because there are only two possible 
standards: the federal standard or the California standard.  At the same time, it also preserves the states’ 
interest in protecting their citizens from environmental harms if the state reaches a different judgment than 
the federal government regarding the need for protection against those harms.  
200
 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
201
 One exception to this premise might be when the state regulation would violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause, in which case the preemptive effect of congressional inaction is derived from the underlying 
constitutional provision rather than the inaction of Congress. 
202
 Legislative inaction can be achieved by any of the three components of the legislative process: the 
House or Senate by failure to approve or the President if a veto cannot be overridden. 
203
 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
204
 Indeed, there is language in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Massachusetts v. EPA strongly 
implying that, if EPA finds as a scientific matter that GHGs have harmful environmental effects, it has no 
discretion not to regulate them.  The Court stated: 
If EPA makes a finding of endangerment, the Clean Air Act requires the agency to 
regulate emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new motor vehicles. . . .  Under the 
clear terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid taking further action only if it 
determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides 
some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to 
determine whether they do.  To the extent that this constrains agency discretion to pursue 
other priorities of the Administrator or the President, this is the congressional design. 
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Congress intended to authorize EPA to preempt states’ ability to regulate harmful 
pollutants by declining to exercise its regulatory authority.205 Moreover, the extent to 
which agency construction of preemption provisions should be accorded “Chevron 
deference” is the subject of considerable debate.206  Under our framework, the usual 
presumption against preemption has been overcome by express statutory language and 
the need for uniformity provides a strong basis for ceiling preemption.  At the same time, 
it is unclear whether Congress actually considered the circumstance of EPA’s refusal to 
regulate a pollutant.   
 
Because there is an express preemption provision, the critical question for 
preemption of state regulation of GHG emissions by motor vehicles is how that provision 
is to be construed.207  It preempts “any standard relating to the control of emissions from 
new motor vehicles or motor vehicle engines subject to this part.”  Whatever the 
collective implications of state standards for GHG emission from motor vehicles, this text 
would appear to leave little doubt that state standards regulating GHG emissions are 
preempted.  After Massachusetts v. EPA,208 it is clear that GHGs are “pollutants” within 
the scope of the act, and therefore “subject to this part,” and California’s restrictions 
likewise clearly qualify as “standards relating to emissions from new motor vehicles.”  
California appears to recognize this and has applied for a waiver,209 which EPA must 
grant unless it finds that the state standards are arbitrary and capricious, the state does not 
need the standards to meet compelling and extraordinary circumstances, or the standards 
                                                                                                                                                 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007).  See also supra note ___ and accompanying text.  But 
cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1263 (stating that “[w]e need not and do not reach the question 
whether on remand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns can inform 
EPA's actions in the event that it makes such a finding”). 
205
 One of the authors has argued elsewhere that Congress should preempt state environmental regulation 
despite federal inaction in very limited circumstances, such as when it determines either that a state’s 
regulatory initiative would inappropriately impose adverse impacts on other states or that federal policies 
can best be achieved in the absence of positive regulation at any level of government. Further, the courts 
should find implied preemption arising from federal regulatory inaction based on a conflict with federal 
objectives only if Congress has explicitly delegated to a federal agency the power to preempt state law to 
prevent it from subverting federal goals and the agency has clearly and persuasively exercised that 
authority.  See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Nothing Is Real: Protecting the Regulatory Void through 
Federal Preemption by Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming). 
206
 Indeed, several of the participants in this symposium focus on this issue.  See Nina Mendelson, Federal 
Agency Preemption of State Law, __ NW. U. L. REV. ___ (200_); Ernest Young, Executive Preemption of 
State Law, __ NW. U. L. REV. ___ (200_).  See also Nina Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. 
L. REV. 737 (2004). 
207
 Nonetheless, the foregoing analysis might suggest that Congress should consider amendments to limit 
the scope of preemption or otherwise protect states when EPA fails to regulate harmful pollutants.  
208
 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).  Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, this was a more 
difficult question because one ground EPA gave for not regulating GHGs was that they were not pollutants.  
Were this so, then GHGs would be outside the scope of the CAA altogether and thus (although the industry 
argued otherwise) not within the scope of the preemption provision.  The Supreme Court, however, 
squarely held that GHGs are pollutants within the scope of the CAA and regulation of their emission by 
motor vehicles would thus be within the scope of the statutory preemption provision. 
209
 See Lisa Friedman, Smog Fighters Furious at Bush Administration, DAILY NEWS OF LOS ANGELES, July 
3, 2007, 2007 WLNR 12575056 (describing opposition to California’s request for a waiver within the 
federal Department of Transportation). 
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do not meet the general requirements for regulation of motor vehicle emissions under 
section 202(a) of the CAA.210  
 
The second complicating factor is that the only currently available way to reduce 
GHG emissions in motor vehicles is to increase fuel economy.  Thus, the regulation of 
GHG emissions has clear and direct practical implications for fuel economy standards, 
which are subject to a different regulatory regime.  Under the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act (EPCA), NHTSA is authorized to establish corporate fuel economy 
standards for manufacturer motor vehicle fleets.211  State regulation of fuel economy 
standards for automobiles implicates the same kinds of uniformity concerns as regulation 
of motor vehicle emissions, so it is not surprising that the statute includes an express 
preemption provision that bars the states from adopting regulations “related to fuel 
economy standards . . . for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard 
under [EPCA].”212   
 
Thus, in its challenge to California’s auto emission standards for GHGs, the auto 
industry argued not only that they were preempted by the CAA, but also that California’s 
GHG controls are “related to fuel economy standards” and therefore expressly preempted 
by the EPCA.213  NHTSA has advanced similar arguments in favor of preemption of 
GHG emission standards,214 and the district court held that the plaintiffs stated a claim 
                                                 
210
 See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(A)-(C) (200_).  Although a full discussion of the issue is beyond the scope 
of this article, these provisions would appear to allow EPA to deny the petition, although that decision 
would presumably be subject to judicial review. 
211
 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a), (c).  The statute requires that NHTSA set the standards “at the maximum feasible 
average fuel economy level,” after taking into consideration factors that include technological feasibility, 
economic practicability, the effect of other government standards on motor vehicle fuel economy, and the 
need to conserve energy.   49 U.S.C. § 39209(a), (c), (f). 
212
 49 U.S.C. § 32919. 
213
 Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1167  (E.D. Cal. 2006).  The 
industry also argued that the state regulatory program conflicts with the EPCA because it frustrates the 
balance between fuel economy and safety struck by NHTSA  According to the industry, the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program was designed to impose fuel economy standards that maximize 
fuel economy, while at the same time avoiding economic harm to the auto industry, maintaining consumer 
choice in vehicle availability, and ensuring vehicle safety, and the state regulatory program will frustrate 
the balance Congress struck among those goals. For example, the industry plaintiffs alleged that by forcing 
manufacturers to invest in fuel economy, California’s regulation of GHG emissions would create a 
Hobson’s choice: “if a manufacturer chooses to redirect its engineers and developers to redesign its 
vehicles for California, it will sacrifice its efforts to introduce new products in markets other than 
California, resulting in lost sales for manufacturers and lost goodwill and profits for dealers.”  Id. at 1169.  
214
 See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light 
Trucks Model Years 2008-2011; Final rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,566, 17,668 (Apr. 6, 2006): 
[M]anufacturers confronted with requirements for the reduction of tailpipe CO2 emissions 
would look at the same pool of technology used to reduce fuel consumption.  NHTSA 
concludes that it is disruptive to the orderly implementation of the CAFE program, and to 
NHTSA's reasonable balancing of competing concerns, to have two different 
governmental entities assessing the need to conserve energy, technological feasibility, 
economic practicability, employment, vehicle safety and other concerns, and making 
inconsistent judgments about how quickly and how much of that single pool of 
technology could and should be required to be installed consistent with those concerns.  
EPCA does not specify how to weight each concern; thus, NHTSA determines the 
appropriate weighting based on the circumstances in each CAFE standard rulemaking.  
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based on their EPCA preemption argument and therefore refused to grant the state’s 
motion for judgment on the pleadings.215   
 
These arguments must be reassessed in light of Massachusetts v. EPA, however, 
insofar as that decision made clear that the CAA, including its preemption provisions, 
applies to GHGs.216 In view of that holding, the implications of EPCA for state regulation 
of GHG emissions by motor vehicles is less one of federal preemption of state law than 
of the interaction between two federal statutes.  Under the CAA, any state regulation of 
GHG emissions by motor vehicles must have been approved for a waiver.  The question 
is whether Congress’s decision to allow a modest departure from uniformity in regulating 
motor vehicle emissions or its desire for uniform fuel economy standards should take 
precedence. 
 
Although a full analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this article a few 
points are worth noting that tend to suggest that GHG waivers should be permitted under 
the CAA notwithstanding the provisions of the EPCA.  The CAA is directly concerned 
with motor vehicle emissions, while the EPCA is focused on fuel economy.  Normally, 
one might expect that a statute dealing directly with a subject would take precedence over 
one that only indirectly implicates the subject.217  Moreover, giving effect to the CAA’s 
waiver provisions would have only a minimal effect on uniformity because there would 
be at most two sets of requirements to meet: the federal standards and the California 
standards (which may be adopted by other states).218  By way of contrast, precluding EPA 
from issuing a waiver for California’s efforts to regulate GHG emissions would – as to 
GHGs – entirely thwart Congress’s decision to allow California to play the role of 
innovator in restricting mobile source pollution.219 
                                                                                                                                                 
More important, ignoring the judgments made by NHTSA at the direction of Congress 
could result in setting standards at levels higher than NHTSA can legally justify under 
EPCA, increasing the risk of the harms that that body sought to avoid, e.g., serious 
adverse economic consequences for motor vehicle manufacturers and unduly limited 
choices for consumers. 
215
 Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. 
216
 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459-62 (2007). 
217
 Insofar as Congress did not directly address the matter, it is reasonable to assume that it did not consider 
the interaction between fuel economy and emission standards when it adopted the statutes.  In the absence 
of strong evidence to the contrary, then, it is also reasonable to assume that Congress did not anticipate that 
adoption of a preemption provision for fuel economy standards would displace the CAA’s waiver system 
for emissions.  
218
 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
219
 One critical reason for the waiver program is congressional recognition of California’s leadership role in 
the fight against automotive pollution – the state adopted mandatory controls on motor vehicle emissions in 
1959, long before the federal government did. See JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND 
POLICY 103 (1977).  In similar fashion, California has been the first state to adopt mandatory controls on 
emissions of GHGs from motor vehicles (as well as the first state to adopt an across-the-board set of 
controls for stationary sources).  Congress also recognized “the unique problems facing California as a 
result of its climate and topography,” which made the adverse effects of automotive pollutants such as 
ozone particularly severe in that state.  H.R. REP. No. 90-278, at 42 (1967).  See also id. at 39-40 stating 
that “[a]lthough the situation may change, in the 15 years that auto emission standards have been debated 
and discussed, only the State of California has demonstrated compelling and extraordinary circumstances 
sufficiently different from the Nation as a whole to justify standards on automobile emissions which may, 
from time to time, need [to] be more stringent than national standards”).  California does not face uniquely 
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Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the claim in Massachusetts v. 
EPA that restrictions on GHG emissions from motor vehicles would conflict with 
NHTSA’s implementation of the CAFE standards under the ECPA.  EPA asserted that it 
lacks the power to regulate CO2 emissions from motor vehicles because doing so would 
require it to tighten mileage standards, a task that Congress delegated exclusively to 
NHTSA.220 The Court responded that the fact that NHTSA sets CAFE standards “in no 
way licenses EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities.  EPA has been charged with 
protecting the public’s ‘health’ and ‘welfare,’ a statutory obligation wholly independent 
of [NHTSA’s] mandate to promote energy efficiency.  The two obligations may overlap, 
but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations 
and yet avoid inconsistency.”221   
 
Under our framework, the benefits of uniform standards provide a strong 
justification for ceiling preemption of state environmental regulation of motor vehicles,222 
as reflected in the incorporation of express preemption provisions in both the CAA and 
the EPCA.  Even in this context, however, Congress recognized state concerns and 
incorporated a waiver provision in the CAA that accommodates to some degree a state’s 
decision to adopt more protective regulation, while minimizing the degree to which state 
regulation will disrupt Congress’s desire to achieve uniformity.  This result is an 
excellent example of the political safeguards of federalism at work.  Insofar as EPA is not 
subject to those political safeguards, Congress and the courts should be especially 
reluctant to allow EPA, through its failure to regulate GHGs, to displace all state 
authority to do so.223 
 
b.  State Regulation of Stationary Source Emissions 
 
 Efforts by the states to regulate GHGs from stationary sources present different 
questions because the transactions costs created by varying state standards are much 
                                                                                                                                                 
severe concentrations of CO2, but its long Pacific coast may make it more susceptible to the risk of coastal 
flooding caused by sea levels that rise in response to global climate change.  For a discussion of the 
possible links between global climate change, melting glaciers and ice sheets, and rising sea levels, see 
generally Glicksman, supra note ___.  California could experience other adverse effects of global climate 
change.  See, e.g.., ____ Murphy, Study Finds Climate Shift Threatens California, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 
2004, at A19 (reporting on a study financed by the Department of Energy and the California Energy 
Commission which predicted a reduction in snow pack in the Sierra Nevada of from 73-90 percent by the 
end of the century if fossil fuel use continues at its present pace; such a reduction would disrupt water 
supplies to the San Francisco Bay Area and the Central Valley); A.L. Westerling et al., Warming and 
Earlier Spring Increases Western U.S. Forest Wildfire Activity, 313 SCIENCE 940 (Aug. 18, 2006) 
(describing University of California study linking increased wildfire activity to global climate change).  
220
 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1461-62 (2007). 
221
 Id. at 1462 (citations omitted). 
222
 The adoption of state motor vehicle emission controls on GHGs raises additional issues relating to the 
balancing of competing interests that will be discussed infra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
223
 Cf. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY 
L.J. 159, 163 (2006) (asserting that preemption “is the real boogeyman of public interest lawmaking 
because it prevents the political process from policing itself”). 
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lower.  Stationary sources do not move across state lines.  Moreover, stationary sources 
are not generally mass produced, so it is unnecessary to gear up multiple production 
methodologies to meet both federal emission controls promulgated under the CAA and 
any more stringent state standards.   
 
These differences are reflected in the CAA itself, insofar as there is no express 
preemption provision applicable to stationary sources and the CAA clearly preserves the 
authority of states to regulate stationary sources more aggressively than required by 
federal law.224  If CO2 were to be designated as a criteria pollutant, for example, the states 
would have the primary authority to decide which controls to impose on various kinds of 
stationary sources located within their borders.225  The rationale that supports allowing 
the states to decide how to allocate the burdens of reducing ozone pollution, for example, 
would also necessarily support allowing the states to make similar decisions with respect 
to CO2 emissions.  Site-specific state decisions on the allocation of CO2 emissions create 
no greater transactions costs than the SIPs and Title V permits226 issued under the CAA 
for the other criteria pollutants.  Likewise, if EPA were to adopt national emission 
standards for new stationary sources under § 111 of the Act227 or national emissions 
standards for hazardous air pollutants under § 112228 that apply to GHGs, the current 
statute would allow states to adopt their own controls, provided they were at least as 
stringent as the federal standards.229   
 
In view of these provisions, concerns for uniformity cannot be characterized as 
particularly central to the purposes of the CAA’s regulation of stationary sources.230  In 
addition, as noted previously, EPA’s failure to regulate GHG emissions means that 
implied ceiling preemption would create a regulatory void that states would be precluded 
from filling.  Thus, the purpose of promoting uniformity so as to reduce transactions costs 
would not appear to be sufficiently strong to warrant ceiling preemption of state 




As indicated above,231 federal intervention in environmental regulatory matters is 
sometimes justified as a means of preventing states from trying to exclude important but 
                                                 
224
 Congress included an express floor preemption provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7416, but there is no 
corresponding provision for ceiling preemption. 
225
 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410; Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975) 
(concluding that “so long as the ultimate effect of a State’s choice of emission limitations is compliance 
with the national standards for ambient air, the state is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission 
limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation”). 
226
 The CAA required states to develop permit programs as a means of imposing and enforcing controls on 
individual sources.  42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f. 
227
 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
228
 42 U.S.C. § 7412. 
229
 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
230
 Moreover, the absence of a ceiling preemption provision for stationary sources gives rise to a negative 
inference insofar as the statute includes an express ceiling preemption provision for motor vehicle 
emissions standards. 
231
 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
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environmentally undesirable activities.  In essence, the state or locality in which the 
activity is located bears all the costs, but the economic benefits of the activity are 
exported to a significant degree to other states.  Thus, a state prohibiting these activities 
or imposing restrictions with the same practical effect often hopes to enjoy the benefits of 
the activities when they wind up locating in another state.232  The NIMBY problem 
provides a strong justification for exclusive federal control of certain regulatory regimes, 
such as those governing hazardous waste transportation, nuclear waste generation or 
disposal, or the operation of facilities that present attractive targets for terrorist attacks.233 
 
The desire to avoid NIMBYism, however, is not a central purpose of the CAA 
and lends no support to ceiling preemption of state regulations directed at global climate 
change.  If anything, the CAA reflects a desire to combat a race to the bottom among 
states, rather than to combat excessive regulation based on a desire to avoid 
environmental harms.  Given the unique characteristics of GHGs, moreover, states have 
no incentive to engage in NIMBYism.  A CO2-belching power plant will have the same 
impact on global climate change whether it is located in southwestern Kansas, 
southeastern Alabama, or Beijing, even if the magnitude and kind of threats facing each 
of those areas as a result of climate change may differ.  The exclusion of such a power 
plant from a state concerned about its vulnerability to global climate change will not 
shield the state from the adverse impacts of climate change if the plant is located and 
begins to operate elsewhere. Global climate change from GHG emissions actually creates 
the reverse (race to the bottom) incentives because a state could lower its standards to 
compete with other states for the economic benefits of a new power plant without 
increasing environmental costs to its own residents, who would experience the same 
harms regardless of where the plant is located.234   
 
C.  Secondary Purposes and Balancing 
 
Although the environmental purposes of the CAA provide little basis for ceiling 
preemption of state regulation of GHG emissions (with the principal exception of motor 
vehicle emissions), analysis of ceiling preemption would not be complete without some 
consideration of other purposes underlying the act.  In particular, the primary focus of the 
CAA was to achieve cleaner and healthier air by responding to collective action problems 
likely to cause under-regulation by states of air-polluting activities, but Congress did not 
disregard the economic burdens of regulation.  Thus, the statutory text and legislative 
history contain various statements indicating the intent to strike a balance between 
environmental protection and regulatory burdens.235  In principle, it is possible to argue 
                                                 
232
 This is a variant on the free rider problem inherent in the production of public goods.  See supra note 
___ (discussing collective action theory). 
233
 The Department of Homeland Security has taken the position that it has the power to preempt state 
chemical security regulations for high-risk facilities.  See Department of Homeland Security, Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards; Advance Notice of Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,292 (Dec. 28, 2006). 
234
 There may be other kinds of localized adverse environmental effects, such as more localized kinds of air 
pollution or water pollution, that provide reasons for wanting to exclude the plant. 
235
 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (setting forth purpose of protecting and enhancing air quality to 
promote public health and welfare and the productive capacity of the U.S. population); id. § 7470(3) 
(declaring purpose of insuring that economic growth will occur in areas with relatively clean air “in a 
Draft of article forthcoming in Vol. 102, Nw. U. L. Rev. 
Please do not quote without authors’ permission 
Environmental Preemption Glicksman&Levy Draft.doc Page 49 8/14/2007 
for ceiling preemption on the basis that more restrictive regulation of GHGs (or other 
pollutants) would compromise the purpose of reducing regulatory burdens or because it 
would upset the balance struck under the federal statute.236 
 
There is, however, a critical difference between the intent to strike a balance in 
making federal regulatory decisions and the intent to displace state authority to strike a 
different balance.  Given the importance of federalism as a constitutional principle, 
however, caution should be exercised before imposing ceiling preemption on this basis.  
Of course, regulators or regulated entities might prefer ceiling preemption out of a policy 
preference for less environmental regulation or a general mistrust of state and local 
political processes, but in federalism terms that would not distinguish environmental 
regulation from any other regulatory subject matter, including subjects traditionally 
beyond the scope of federal power.  Congress should refrain from ceiling preemption 
unless there are collective action problems that create incentives for states to over-
regulate and courts should be reluctant to find implied preemption in the absence of clear 
evidence of a congressional purpose to prevent over-regulation by states.  
 
Focusing on the economic burdens of regulation, as opposed to environmental 
issues, there are few collective action problems that would create incentives for states to 
over-regulate.  For example, states limiting GHG emissions cannot generally export the 
economic burdens of those regulations to other states and state legislators are politically 
accountable for the regulatory burdens they impose within the state.237  Externalities may 
arise when states regulate products sold within the state but produced elsewhere, an issue 
that arises in connection with motor vehicles and need not be discussed further here.238   
                                                                                                                                                 
manner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air resources”).  See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851 (1984) (characterizing the CAA’s permit program for 
new and modified major stationary sources in nonattainment areas as an effort by Congress “to 
accommodate the conflict between the economic interest in permitting capital improvements to continue 
and the environmental interest in improving air quality”). 
236
 This argument might in some contexts apply to other kinds of considerations that must be balanced 
against environmental benefits.  For example, the CAFE standards adopted by NHTSA represent that 
agency’s effort to comply with its obligation under EPCA to balance a series of health, safety, energy 
policy, and economic factors, which NHTSA has argued would be disrupted by regulation of GHG 
emissions from motor vehicles.  See supra note ___.  If efforts to comply with a state’s tailpipe emission 
standards on GHGs require states to manufacture and sell a different kind of fleet than they would 
otherwise have done in meeting their EPCA obligations, the balance struck by the federal agency might be 
disrupted.  Manufacturers, for example, might decide to build smaller hybrid cars than they would need to 
manufacture to comply with the applicable CAFE standards.  If the occupants of these vehicles are more 
susceptible to injuries from accidents than the occupants of the vehicles they replaced would have been, the 
result might be a decline in safety below the level that NHTSA concluded was desirable.  Such a disruption 
of the federally struck balance raises legitimate concerns, but preemption of state authority should not be 
inferred absent clear evidence that Congress intended to prevent states from striking a different balance 
than the federal agency. 
237
 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.  If anything, because reduced GHG emissions would 
produce the same world-wide environmental benefits regardless of where they occur, the state is bearing 
the regulatory costs but externalizing the environmental benefit. 
238
 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.  Aside from motor vehicles, there appear to be few mass 
produced products that are shipped throughout the United States that emit GHGs.  In other contexts, such as 
products liability, the problem of exporting regulatory burdens through regulation of products sold in a 
state is a much more sweeping one.  
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Another situation in which regulatory burdens may be externalized is the 
regulation of CO2 emissions from electric utilities that generate power through the 
combustion of fossil fuels, which generate a significant percentage of the CO2 emissions 
in the United States.239  The stringency of environmental regulations applicable to utility 
facilities obviously affects the price of electricity that the regulated utilities charge their 
customers.  Because many of the nation’s utilities are connected in a massive interstate 
grid240 and wheel power to one another, sometimes over long distances, the stringent 
regulation of CO2 emissions in one state could cause electricity prices to rise in other 
states.  These concerns might justify a legislative decision to preempt state regulation of 
CO2 emissions,241 but such a judgment is not reflected in the language or history of the 
CAA strongly enough to overcome the presumption against preemption. 
 
Resource pooling issues, race to the bottom arguments, and NIMBY concerns do 
not provide much support for ceiling preemption in this context either.  The limited 
resources of individual states would not tend to cause over-regulation or under-protection 
of economic rights when it comes to GHG regulation.242  And race to the bottom 
arguments are particularly weak in the context of GHG emissions, because aggressive 
regulation of GHGs by states and localities cannot produce concentrated environmental 
amenities. Thus, even if communities were somehow engaged in a race to the top in 
which they compete to over-regulate pollution-causing activities so as to attract desirable 
citizens or businesses,243 the regulation of GHG emissions would not be an attractive 
means of competing.  A GHG-emitting plant in another state will have the same 
environmental impact as it would have had if it had located in the state whose law 
precluded it.  For the same reason, state and local governments have no incentive to 
engage in NIMBYism regarding GHG emissions. 
 
                                                 
239
 Janine Maney, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Climate Change, and the Clean Air Act: An Analysis of 
Whether Carbon Dioxide Should Be Listed as a Criteria Pollutant, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 298, 370 (2005) 
(citing U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Climate Action Report-2002, Third Communication of the United States of 
America Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 226 (2002), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ResourceCenterPublicationsUSClimateAction) 
(stating that electrical utilities accounted for twenty-nine percent of U.S. emissions from 1990 to 1999). 
240
 See Kathleen C. Reilly, Note, Global Benefits versus Local Concerns: The Need for a Bird's Eye View of  
Nuclear Energy, 70 IND. L.J. 679, 701-02 (1995). 
241
 If Congress is concerned about the economic disruptions that such price hikes might cause, it could 
address this problem through a variety of means other than ceiling preemption of state GHG regulation.  
For example, it could address the issue through rate regulation or the provision of federal subsidies to those 
consumers hardest hit by price increases traceable to the imposition of controls on emissions.  Those 
options would prevent the state seeking to regulate emissions from exporting economic burdens to other 
states while protecting the environmental policy decision of the regulating state. 
242
 It might be argued that lack of information could lead states to over-regulate because of information 
processing errors that lead to exaggerated public fears of environmental harms.  See supra note ___ and 
accompanying text.  But as noted previously, once information has been produced the federal and state 
governments are acting on the same information and responding to the same public fears.  Thus, it not clear 
why the federal judgment about the legitimacy of those fears is inherently more likely to be accurate than 
the state’s judgment. 
243
 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
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Perhaps the strongest argument for ceiling preemption based on the legislative 
purpose of minimizing regulatory burdens can be derived from uniformity concerns.  
Even outside of the motor vehicle context, uniform federal regulation will reduce the 
transaction costs for regulated entities.  Indeed, it is not unusual for industries facing the 
potential application of regulatory standards that differ from state to state to support the 
adoption of federal regulation (sometimes even stringent regulation), provided it 
preempts any state regulations that deviate from the federal program.244  Some industries 
that emit GHGs have expressed support for mandatory federal controls precisely because 
they fear being subject to a welter of regulatory regimes that differ from state to state in 
the absence of preemptive federal regulation.245 
 
Nonetheless, this argument is inherent in any federal regulation of any field.  
Thus, in the absence of an express preemption provision or clear evidence that a major 
purpose of the CAA was to impose uniform federal standards so as to minimize 
transaction costs for regulated entities, a general concern for regulatory burdens should 
not be sufficient to support implied ceiling preemption of state regulation of GHG 
emissions on uniformity grounds.  In this regard, the differences between motor vehicle 
emissions and emissions from stationary sources are particularly instructive.  In the 
context of motor vehicle emissions, where the transactions costs of nonuniform state 
regulation are especially great, Congress focused on uniformity concerns and 
incorporated express preemption provisions.  As to stationary sources, however, for 
which transactions costs of nonuniform state regulation are less significant, there is no 
express preemption provision and the CAA expressly preserves the authority of states to 
regulate more aggressively than the federal government.246 
 
The critical point here is that the primary goal of the CAA is to reduce air 
pollution, and that secondary economic goals should not be sufficient, without more, to 
establish the requisite preemptive intent.  A recent Federal Court of Appeals decision 
under the CAA, Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n, Inc. v. Davis,247 illustrates the appropriate 
approach to secondary purposes under our framework.  The CAA at one time required 
that gasoline sold in heavily polluted parts of the country contain a minimum oxygen 
content by weight.248  Initially, to meet the oxygen content requirements, gasoline 
manufacturers added oxygenate fuel additives to their products.  Methyl tertiary butyl 
ether (MTBE) and ethanol were the two most widely used additives.249  After 
determining that MTBE poses risks of groundwater contamination from leaking storage 
tanks, California banned MTBE as a fuel additive within the state.  A trade association of 
MTBE manufacturers sued the state, claiming that the CAA implicitly preempted the 
state’s ban because the state ban conflicted with the statutory purposes of giving gasoline 
                                                 
244
 See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 
IOWA L. REV. 377, 466 (2005). 
245
 See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, A Coalition for Firm Limit on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007. 
246
 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
247
 331 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2003). 
248
 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(2)(B), (m)(2)(B).  This requirement was part of an effort to bolster the use of “clean 
fuels” that are inherently less polluting than those already on the market.  Congress repealed the oxygenate 
requirement in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1504, 119 Stat. 594, 1077. 
249
 Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n, Inc. v. Davis, 331 F.3d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Draft of article forthcoming in Vol. 102, Nw. U. L. Rev. 
Please do not quote without authors’ permission 
Environmental Preemption Glicksman&Levy Draft.doc Page 52 8/14/2007 
producers unrestricted choice among oxygenate fuel additives and of ensuring an 
adequate and reasonably priced supply of oxygenated gasoline.250   
 
The Ninth Circuit dismissed both arguments.  Beginning with the proposition that 
various provisions of the CAA reflect the intent to preserve state authority,251 including 
one that explicitly retained special discretion for California to restrict fuel additives,252 
the court found no evidence in the text or legislative history to support the conclusion that 
state regulation of fuel additives would conflict with the congressional design.  “There is 
some evidence,” the court found, “that the EPA is required to be [oxygenate] neutral, but 
there is none that the states must also be neutral.”253  The Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the 
association’s claim that the state ban would improperly disrupt the gasoline market is 
even more revealing as to the limited role that secondary purposes should play in 
preemption analysis: 
 
The central goal of the Clean Air Act is to reduce air pollution. . . . .  OFA 
has offered virtually no support for its assertion that the Clean Air Act's 
goals − for purposes of preemption analysis − are a smoothly functioning 
market and cheap gasoline.  It is questionable whether a smoothly 
functioning market should be considered a “goal” of the Clean Air Act; 
the statutory text describing the purposes of the Act mentions no such 
goal.  We take it as true that Congress wanted to reduce pollution caused 
by motor vehicles, but at the same time did not want to harm the nation's 
economy by causing gasoline prices to rise substantially.  But saying that 
Congress might not have wanted to cause a substantial increase in gasoline 
prices is not the same as saying that assuring inexpensive gasoline was a 
goal of the Act.254 
 
Invoking the presumption against preemption of state authority in areas of traditional 
state control (such as environmental regulation), the court found insufficiently clear 
evidence of a congressional intent to oust state regulation of fuel additives to invalidate 
California’s ban.255  
 
The analysis in the fuel additive case does not preclude Congress from 
preempting state regulation that would frustrate the secondary purposes associated with 
environmental legislation.  It simply cautions courts not to find preemption based on 
conflicts with those purposes absent clear indicia of congressional intent, preferably on 
the face of the statute.  In the same way, state regulation of GHG emissions from 
stationary sources might interfere with secondary goals of the CAA, including balancing 
environmental protection and economic growth.  But in the absence of a much clearer 
expression from Congress that states are precluded from striking a different balance than 
                                                 
250
 Id. at 670. 
251
 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3), (b)(4), (c). 
252
 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(B). 
253
 Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n, 331 F.3d at 672. 
254
 Id. at 673. 
255
 Id. 
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the one struck by EPA, these goals do not support implied ceiling preemption of state 
regulation of GHG emissions. 
 
 D. Federal Cap-and-Trade Programs 
 
As an extra added bonus, we offer some preliminary thoughts about a final form 
of federal regulation of GHG emissions: cap-and-trade programs.256  The regional cap-
and-trade program established by the RGGI initiative of the northeastern and mid-
Atlantic states provides one example.257  The Kyoto Protocol and the European Union’s 
program for controlling CO2 emissions both allow emissions trading under a cap-and 
trade program.258  The legislation introduced in Congress to establish mandatory controls 
on CO2 emissions in the United States also has tended to rely on cap-and-trade 
approaches.259  It seems highly likely, then, that any federal legislation directed at climate 
change that is adopted will authorize emissions trading. 
 
Assuming that a federal cap-and-trade system is adopted for GHG emissions, the 
question becomes the extent to which ceiling preemption would be justified.  The “cap” 
portion of such a program reflects conventional justifications for federal environmental 
regulations, particularly externalities and the race to the bottom, that would not generally 
support ceiling preemption, but the “trade” component reflects a legislative judgment that 
market forces would lead to the most efficient allocation of pollution reduction 
obligations.  Restrictions by states on trading of federal allowances would tend to 
undermine the efficiency of that market, but it does not follow inevitably that the cap-
and-trade system will or should preempt state regulation. 
 
The answer to that question depends on the impact of the state restriction on the 
market and the state interests that might justify restrictions.  The most likely form of state 
regulation would be the adoption (or retention) of state laws that restrict GHG emissions 
by sources within the state.260  Such a regulation would tend to distort the market for 
efficient allocation of emissions in two ways.  First, it would prevent high cost pollution 
avoiders within the state from using emission allowances, thus forcing them either to 
reduce emissions or to locate in another state.  Second, and as a result of the first effect, it 
would reduce the demand for and increase the supply of allowances in other states, which 
means that at the margins some sources that would sell allowances and reduce emissions 
will instead consume or purchase allowances and pollute instead. 
 
Notwithstanding this effect on the market, there may be state interests that would 
justify permitting this sort of restriction on trades as a general matter, although they 
                                                 
256
 Under a cap-and-trade program, total emissions of a given pollutant are capped and businesses are 
allocated a proportion of the total as emission allowances, which can then be used, sold, or traded.  The 
theory is that market forces will encourage low cost pollution avoiders to reduce their emissions and sell 
their allowances, which will in turn be purchased by polluters for whom it would be costly to reduce 
emissions.  In this way, market forces will lead to an efficient allocation of pollution. 
257
 See supra note ___ and accompanying text. 
258
 See, e.g., HUNTER ET AL., supra note ___, at 691-94, 705-11. 
259
 E.g., S. 843, § 704, 108th Cong. , 1st Sess. (2003). 
260
 A state law that directly restricts purchases would have essentially the same effect. 
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would not appear to apply to GHGs.  While a cap-and-trade program promotes 
economically efficient allocation of the costs of reducing pollution, it does nothing to 
promote efficient allocation of environmental harms.  Put differently, high cost pollution 
avoiders may be located in areas in which the costs of pollution are also particularly high 
(such as densely populated areas or critical and widely used aquifers).  In addition, if 
individual polluters may purchase unlimited allowances, there is a potential for the 
creation of “hot spots” that states may legitimate wish to prevent.  These points are well 
illustrated by the example of mercury pollution.  
 
In 2005, EPA issued regulations for mercury emissions from coal-fired electric 
utilities that established a cap-and-trade program under which allowances are readily 
transferable among all regulated facilities.261   Because mercury is a toxic pollutant that 
tends to concentrate in the vicinity of the emission source, however, if a facility regulated 
under a cap-and-trade program purchases large numbers of allowances, residents located 
near the purchasing source may be exposed to dangerously high levels of mercury.262  
Thus, a significant number of states have either prohibited sources within the state from 
participating in the mercury cap-and-trade program or restricted their ability to do so.263  
Although these restrictions interfere with the market for allowances, EPA’s rule 
recognizes the states’ interest in avoiding hot spots and explicitly allows states to opt out 
of the trading scheme264 and to adopt more stringent controls.265 
 
For pollutants that tend to stay near the emitting sources and may create hot spots, 
there are powerful reasons for federal regulators to respect the state’s interest in 
preventing concentrations of pollutants and no particular reason to believe that such 
regulations would be the result of collective action problems that distort state 
                                                 
261
 Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating 
Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005).  The regulations reflect EPA’s conclusion that such an 
approach represents the most cost-effective way to achieve reductions in mercury emissions from power 
plants.  Id. 
262
 See Lisa Heinzerling & Rena Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration, 34 
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10297 (2004); Lisa Heinzerling & Rena Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: 
Mercury and the Bush Administration, Part II, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10485 (2004). 
263
 See Margaret Kriz, States Blowing Out the Fuse on Mercury Rule, 24 ENVTL. F. No. 1 (Nov./Dec. 
2006), at 6 (indicating that 24 states have approved or are in the process of approving restrictions on 
mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants that are more stringent than those adopted by EPA in 
2005); John Pendergrass, States Rolling Out Mercury Cut Plans, 23 ENVTL. F. No. 6 (Jan./Feb. 2007), at 
10). 
264
 40 C.F.R. § 60.24(h).  See also 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,624 (stating that for “States that elect not to 
participate in an EPA-managed cap-and-trade program, their respective State [mercury] budgets will serve 
as a firm cap”); id. at 28,640 (indicating that “States, in fact, can choose not to participate in the optional 
cap-and-trade program.  However, EPA believes that a cap-and-trade system for the power sector is the 
best approach for reducing Hg emissions and EPA's analysis assumes that States will adopt this more cost 
effective approach.”). 
265
 40 C.F.R. § 60.24(g).  See also 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,632 (indicating that “States remain authorized to 
require emissions reductions beyond those required by the State budget, and nothing in the final rule will 
preclude the States from requiring such stricter controls and still being eligible to participate in the Hg 
Budget Trading Program”). 
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incentives.266  Such restrictions do not involve the exportation of economic burdens to 
other states.267  Although the state’s restrictions on the purchase of allowances has the 
potential to affect prospective out-of-state sellers,268 the restrictions will be facially 
neutral; in-state as well as out-of-state sales will both be affected.  Thus, while such 
restrictions may cause minor disruptions of the market, they may be justified by 
legitimate state concerns and are not likely to reflect distorted incentives caused by 
collective action problems.269 
 
These arguments are irrelevant to the regulation of GHG emissions, however, 
because the effects of GHG emissions on global climate change are not localized and 
there is no potential for the creation of hot spots.270  Nonetheless, a state might decide to 
restrict purchase and use of allowances because it believes the federal cap is too generous 
and that greater reductions in GHG emissions are needed.  There is no particular reason 
to believe this judgment would be the product of a collective action problem that distorts 
the state’s regulatory incentives.271  On the other hand, in the context of GHGs, such 
regulation by states would disrupt the efficiency of the market for allowances without any 
corresponding environmental benefit because out of state sources would purchase (at 
somewhat lower cost) the excess allowances from sources within the state and the same 
total amount of GHGs would be emitted.   
 
                                                 
266
 In response to pressure from federal legislators, for example, EPA has reportedly considered adopting its 
own restrictions on trading of benzene emissions credits among oil refineries as a means of addressing 
potential hot spots.  See INSIDE E.P.A. WEEKLY, Feb. 2, 2007, at 1, 8-9.  Nevertheless, when EPA issued its 
regulations for controlling emissions of hazardous air pollutants, including benzene, from motor vehicles, 
in 2007, it decided not to impose geographic restrictions on trading based on its finding that doing so could 
reduce refiners’ incentives to generate credits and “hinder trading essential to this program.”  Control of 
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 72 Fed. Reg. 8428, 8489 (Feb. 26, 2007).  It did, however, 
put a ceiling on the total content of benzene in gasoline produced after 2011.  See id. at 8477 (stating that 
“credits may not be used to demonstrate compliance with the 1.3% maximum average standard”); id. at 
8484 (explaining that a maximum average cap ensures “that the benzene content of gasoline produced by 
each refiner . . . will average no higher than this standard, regardless of the use of credits”); 40 C.F.R. § 
80.1230(b)(2).  More to the point, the federal regulations will not affect California’s pre-existing standard, 
which is more stringent than the new federal standards.  Id. § 80.1236.  
267
 It might be argued, by analogy to the taxation of federal institutions in McCulloch, see supra notes ___ 
and accompanying text, that the disruption of the cap-and-trade market for allowances imposes burdens on 
the federal program that are born by all the states, while the environmental benefits of preventing hot spots 
are concentrated locally.  By the same token, however, other states are externalizing the environmental 
costs of activities causing unsafe concentrations of pollution elsewhere.  Thus, any congressional decision 
to preempt in this area should carefully consider the states’ interests in protecting their citizens from 
significant environmental harms. 
268
 If there are fewer allowance buyers competing for allowances in the cap-and-trade market, the price 
sellers are able to charge for an allowance will fall. 
269
 One exception would be if there is a NIMBY problem, in the sense that states have an incentive to limit 
purchases so as to force environmentally hazardous, but necessary activities, elsewhere.  In such cases, 
ceiling preemption to protect a cap-and-trade program may be necessary, but it might also be necessary to 
ensure that federal regulation addresses the hot-spot problem in some way. 
270
 On the other hand, some states might bear the costs of climate change more heavily, particularly states 
with significant coastlines. 
271
 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
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Nonetheless, Congress might not wish to prevent states from reducing the total 
emissions from sources within their jurisdiction as a means of ratcheting total national 
emissions below the overall cap established by federal law.  After all, the primary goal of 
a cap-and-trade program is the reduction of emissions, which might weigh more heavily 
than the goal of preventing any disruption of the market for allowances.  To make such 
reductions effective, however, it would be necessary to cap the total federal allowance 
within a state at the level of its more stringent pollution controls.  Such an approach 
would prevent the stringently regulated sources from flooding the market, causing a 
decline in the value of an allowance in other states. That solution will also contribute to a 
reduction of total GHG emissions, thereby promoting the environmental protection goals 
of both the federal and state programs. 
 
Instead of or in addition to restricting purchases or use of allowances, state 
regulation might restrict or prevent the sale of allowances.  This kind of state restriction 
has already arisen in the context of efforts to control acid rain.  In 2000, the New York 
legislature adopted a law that assessed an “air pollution mitigation offset” equal to any 
sum received for the sale or trade of SO2 allowances to a regulated facility operating in an 
upwind state.  Any money received by a regulated unit in New York in such a transaction 
was forfeited to the state public utility commission, effectively banning sales to utilities 
in upwind states.272  The impetus for the New York statute was its desire to prevent SO2 
emissions by mid-western utilities from migrating to and adversely affecting New York 
in the form of acid rain.273  When the facial constitutionality of the law was challenged, 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the CAA preempted New York’s 
law because the latter interfered with the method selected by Congress for regulating SO2 
emissions, including a nationwide allowance transfer system.274  
 
Our model for analyzing ceiling preemption under environmental laws suggests 
that the Second Circuit reached the correct result.  The situation represented one of 
reciprocal externalities.  Ohio’s failure to restrict the emissions of its own utilities 
resulted in the export of pollution to New York, but the New York law imposed 
economic externalities on Ohio by forcing Ohio utilities to purchase allowances 
elsewhere or reduce their emissions.275  Because neither of the states can be expected to 
accommodate its laws (and sacrifice the interests of its citizens) to achieve the interests of 
the other state, a federal solution is necessary.  In this instance, the interstate migration of 
pollution suggests the need for the federal decisionmaker to carefully design the rules 
governing the purchase and sale of allowances in light of the ability of one state to export 
the burdens of its pollution to another.  Because GHGs operate on a global rather than a 
regional level, however, the kind of restrictions that New York adopted in an effort to 
                                                 
272
 Even if allowances were sold elsewhere, moreover, the offset could be avoided only by attaching a 
restrictive covenant to a transfer of SO2 allowances that prohibited their later transfer to and usage in an 
upwind state.   
273
 See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note __, at 541-42. 
274
 Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003).  The court did not reach the issue of 
whether the state statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 
275
 Either of those options is presumably more expensive than if allowances could be purchased from the 
New York utility. 
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limit out-of-state pollution are unlikely to be a common component of state GHG 
emission control programs. 
 
In sum, state regulation may undermine the efficiency goals of cap-and-trade 
programs and might therefore support a congressional decision in favor of ceiling 
preemption.  Nonetheless, such a decision may impair legitimate countervailing state 
environmental interests that Congress should accommodate in its structuring of cap-and-
trade programs.  States have a legitimate interest in combating the localized effects of 
concentrated pollution (for pollutants, such as mercury, that concentrate near the 
emission source) that may result from the purchase of allowances, whether the pollution 
is caused by sources within or outside of state.  Some steps to combat hot spots and the 
externalization of pollution from sources in upwind or upstream states should be 
incorporated, if the states’ authority to combat such problems is displaced.  These 
concerns are less prominent for GHGs because their impact on global climate change is 
not so localized, but Congress may nonetheless wish to accommodate a state’s desire to 
impose more aggressive restrictions on GHG emissions from sources within the state by 
permitting states to restrict emissions and capping the allowances within the state so as to 




 The issue of ceiling preemption in environmental law is an increasingly important 
and difficult one as states have begun to address environmental concerns that they believe 
have not been adequately addressed at the federal level.  The regulation of GHG 
emissions in response to global climate change is a prime example of this phenomenon.  
While the exercise of federal power to preempt these efforts may be justified by 
legitimate federal concerns, doing so displaces the states’ traditional authority to protect 
the health and safety of their citizens.  The principles of federalism caution against doing 
so lightly.   
 
Collective action theory provides a useful perspective for considering these 
issues.  Insofar as federalism is in many respects a pragmatic response to collective action 
problems, it makes sense to consider preemption issues in terms of their collective action 
implications.  This analysis can guide and inform both congressional and judicial 
decisions about preemption.   
 
In this article, we have used the collective action theory to develop a framework 
for the analysis of preemption in the environmental law context and applied it to the 
specific problem of ceiling preemption of state restrictions on GHG emissions in 
response to global climate change.276  We believe that this example demonstrates the 
utility of the framework.  It does not provide definitive outcomes for complex issues that 
depend on a variety of legal and practical considerations, but it helps to identify the right 
questions and offers insights on how to answer them.   
                                                 
276
 We hope in a subsequent article to develop the framework and consider its application to a broader 
range of regulatory fields. 
